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AUDITING EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar*
Executive branch officials routinely make thousands of decisions affecting public security and welfare. 
While it is rare that such discretionary decisions are entirely immune from some kind of judicial 
review, courts’ role is often so circumscribed or deferential that in some domains the probability of 
uncovering problems through such review almost certainly falls close to zero.  The resulting amount of 
executive discretion carries considerable risks along with rewards.  Some discretionary decisions 
undoubtedly benefit from the speed and flexibility that results from limiting judicial review.  Yet 
judicial review’s evisceration as a tool to restrain certain forms of discretion also makes it easier for 
government officials to subtly manipulate their discretion to promote appealing political impressions, 
for others to engage in outright malfeasance, and for still other (more virtuous) officials to simply fail 
to learn from their mistakes.  Reliance on judicial review to generate information about executive 
discretion makes it difficult to address these concerns in part because courts routinely define much of 
their work in terms of applying the same standard of deference to every potential case in a particular 
class, making it difficult to increase the stringency of review in some policy domains without making 
the costs allegedly prohibitive.  When deciding how stringently to review a discretionary decision –
whether a prosecutorial charging decision, an administrative compliance order, or an enemy 
combatant designation – judges almost invariably mull the potential consequences of their choice on 
all future executive decisions of that kind.  As a conceptual alternative, this article develops a 
framework akin to that employed by courts engaged in sample adjudication for class action and 
government fraud cases.  It relies on the possibility of systematically auditing samples of discretionary 
decisions and making those results public.  Although the efficacy of such a system depends on the 
political context and details of its institutional design, audits have the potential to sever the connection 
between the perceived costs of encroaching on discretion and the stringency of review.  They also 
avoid the potentially distorted picture of bureaucratic activity created by a litigation-driven process.  
Despite their potential value, such audits are nonetheless almost never undertaken by existing federal 
audit bureaucracies (the Government Accountability Office and the department-specific Inspector 
General Offices), nor does the legislature seem to conduct them in connection with oversight hearings.  
I conclude by discussing the political and bureaucratic dynamics working against these audits and 
suggesting how they may be weakened. 
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INTRODUCTION
The problem is a familiar one.  No legal system can ever wholly vanquish 
discretion – and even if it were possible, it would be madness to wring all human 
judgment from the application of legal rules and standards.  But too much discretion 
breeds its own kind of madness.  To manage this predicament, our government subjects 
many decisions to elaborate procedural constraints, but in other domains it ostensibly 
seeks to harness the value of human judgment by leaving public officials with 
considerable discretion.  On a typical day, Labor Department officials decide what plants 
to inspect for occupational safety violations with little or no external review.  Prosecutors 
decide whom to indict.  Treasury officials decide whether to freeze the assets of a charity 
because of alleged links to terrorism.  Homeland security inspectors decide whether a 
Namibian woman will be turned away at a port of entry without being allowed to plead 
her case for asylum, and whose name is placed on a government “no fly” list.  In short, 
despite an often-mentioned social commitment to judicial restraints on public power,1
laws routinely create and protect discretion instead of restraining it.2
1 See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)(subjecting an informal, 
discretionary decision of the Secretary of Transportation to judicial review on the basis of statutory 
language prohibiting federal aid for highways through public parks unless “no feasible and prudent 
alternative” existed).  Overton Park set the stage for a substantial expansion in the availability (and 
stringency) of judicial review governing informal, discretionary decisions.  But review remains either 
3This absence of restraints, in turn, raises the pressing question of how public 
organizations with such considerable discretion will (be forced to) learn from their 
mistakes, and how they will be policed against abusing their legal powers.  While judicial 
review of government action is often considered a central tool in preventing mistakes or 
abuses,3 the benefits of maintaining discretion have led to a vigorous doctrinal and policy 
debate about the proper stringency of such review.4
This article challenges the terms of that debate.  The argument demonstrates how
the paradigm of judicial review, despite its enduring value, sometimes ill-serves the goals 
of helping bureaucratic organizations learn from their failures and avoid political 
unavailable or fairly cursory for a massive range of discretionary decisions involving national security, 
foreign policy, immigration, domestic regulatory enforcement, public benefits, and investigation or 
prosecution.  See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).  Regarding the trope that judicial 
review should have an exalted role in constraining arbitrary bureaucratic action, see Rachel E. Barkow, 
More Supreme Than Court?  The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial 
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness 
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); David Cole, Judging the Next 
Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003);
James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004).
2 See infra notes__.
3 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 184 (summarizing previous 
interpretation of federal jurisdictional statute by emphasizing the Court’s conclusion that “Congress meant 
to hold federal agencies accountable by making their actions subject to judicial review.”); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 
57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 414 (1996)(“The long-term commitment of American administrative law has been 
to assure that administrative discretion is structured, checked, and balanced.  Administrative efficacy must 
be weighed against demands for liberty and legality, as well as political accountability”); Rebecca L. 
Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998)(emphasizing the 
alleged role of judicial review in promoting accountability).   Understandably, judicial review is considered 
important both because of its role in generating information about, and promoting the accountability of, 
executive authorities, and because of its direct remedial role. Regarding “accountability” see, e.g., Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinksi and Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 549, 587-89 (2002); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 509 (2002); Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial 
Review of Decisions of California Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1239 (1995); William 
Christian, Note, Normalization as a Goal: The Americans With Disabilities Act and Individuals With 
Mental Retardation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 409, 417 (1994).  The importance of providing a hearing and a 
remedy for government actions affecting a protected interest, meanwhile, is firmly lodged at the core of 
modern procedural due process doctrine.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1974).
4
 Voices on one side of the debate emphatically insist on greater opportunities for highly-stringent judicial 
review of executive branch actions.  See, e.g., Davis, supra note 1, at 216 (“The vast quantities of 
unnecessary discretionary power that have grown up in our system should be cut back, and the 
discretionary power that is found to be necessary should be properly confined, structured, and checked”); 
Cole, supra note 1, at 2567; Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justice for the “Designated”: The Process That is 
Due to Alleged U.S. Financiers of Terrorism, 93 GEO. L.J. 1387, 1419 (2005)(“The courts should not 
hesitate to act solely because those stripped of their rights are accused terrorists”).  Similarly emphatic
voices take the position in equipoise.  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating 
Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 644 (2003)(“Judicial scrutiny can only interfere with forceful 
executive action.’); Ruth R. Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 328 (2002).  Similar debates play out in the context of constitutional torts.  See, e.g., James J. Park, The 
Constitutional Tort Action As Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 395 (2003).  At least 
some of the debate turns on differing views about the extent to which a larger “political process” promotes 
“accountability.”  I discuss this in Part III.
4pressures endangering their missions.5  Because complex public bureaucracies are 
increasingly (and perhaps inevitably) the custodians of discretionary legal authority that 
can be abused,6 the problems arise both in national security and domestic regulatory 
contexts, domains that have been traditionally treated separately but increasingly blur.7
The article then shows how a government agency can perform quasi-judicial audits of 
discretionary decisions, akin to the sample audits occasionally employed by courts in 
class actions and government fraud cases.8  If an auditing agency overcomes the relevant 
political barriers and conceptual challenges,9 it can fill crucial gaps left by existing 
mechanisms to generate information about executive branch performance.  Even if those 
barriers prove too onerous to surmount, the conceptual work associated with designing an 
audit system can serve as a thought experiment, clarifying the murkiness of conventional 
defenses of broad executive discretion, and shedding light on why such claims 
nonetheless resonate in the legal and political arena.
The argument begins by assuming, for expositional purposes, that judicial review 
is the only institutional mechanism generating information about discretionary executive 
decisions directly affecting individuals or groups, such as whether to decide that an 
individual lacking documents at the border has shown enough “credible fear” to be 
allowed to apply for asylum.  The picture of executive discretion that emerges in such a 
world will inevitably depend on the structural features of judicial review.  That picture 
will reflect, for instance, the courts’ tendency to balance the potential benefits and costs 
of discretion by routinely applying differing degrees of stringency when reviewing 
executive decisions.  Suppose, for instance, that the issue is the fate of individuals that 
executive authorities designate as enemy combatants.  Whether on their own or in accord 
with legislative commands, courts can increase the stringency of review by requiring 
more thorough hearings before someone is designated, and by decreasing the deference 
accorded to the outcome of those hearings or (in the absence of hearings) to the executive 
determinations themselves.10  Greater stringency of review presumably reduces the 
5
 Although this article does not directly address judicial review’s role as provider of individual remedies, 
the argument developed here is nonetheless relevant to the provision of remedies by either courts or 
political actors.  See supra notes __ (discussing the relevance of the argument to court review of individual 
cases); __ (discussing the implications of the argument for how political actors deliver remedies to 
aggrieved individuals or groups). 
6
 The focus here is primarily on the type of discretion, such as that vested in a prosecutorial authority, to 
impose costs on discrete individuals or groups with minimal judicial intervention.  Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 
470 U.S. 821 (1985)(in the absence of specific statutory requirement to the contrary, regulatory agency’s 
decision not to exercise authority in a particular context where such authority could be exercised is 
committed to agency discretion)  See also infra note__ and accompanying text.
7 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2672 (2005)(“In war no 
less than in peace, the inquiry into presidential authority can be organized and disciplined if it is undertaken 
with close reference to standard principles of administrative law.”).
8 See infra note __.
9
 For a discussion of the proverbial “guarding the guardians” problem, see infra notes 190-191 and 
accompanying text.
10 Compare Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602-04 (1988)(finding CIA director’s power to fire employee 
on national security grounds committed by law to agency discretion) with Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands 
Center v. Bureau of Land Mgt., 387 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2004)(finding, under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard that the court understood to require “hard look” review, that the Bureau of Land Management’s 
environmental assessments of two timber sales, conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy 
Act, were inadequate because they failed to consider the cumulative impact of the sales).  I do not mean to 
5probability that someone would be improperly labeled an enemy combatant.  At the same 
time, greater stringency allegedly increases the resources that society must expend on the 
review process and that the executive branch must expend defending its decision.11  If 
stricter review consumes substantially greater resources or creates a material possibility 
of embarrassment for executive officials, it may also chill the authorities from 
designating individuals that should (in an ideal world) receive such a designation.  In 
response, courts tend to vary the stringency of review governing a given pool of potential 
cases.
But this strategy of applying a given degree of review stringency across the board 
entails its own costs.  By forging rules applying to every case in a particular class, courts 
and legislators can impose dramatic limits on society’s ability to learn how executive 
discretion is used.12  Increasing the stringency of review for a single decision appears 
difficult, if not impossible, without sharply (and, it is sometimes asserted, dangerously) 
increasing costly burdens on courts and the government.  Even if one assumes 
(implausibly) that existing rules governing stringency of review reflects a careful analysis 
of marginal costs and benefits, existing limits on review stringency almost certainly 
augur problems for society’s ability to learn how discretion is used.
Government regulators and private employers, in contrast, routinely manage to 
avoid such traps.  Instead of reviewing an entire population’s behavior, they obtain 
samples of it.  Insurance companies examine a subset of closed files to assess the quality 
of payout determinations.13  Government agents select a subset of plants to inspect or 
accounting records to scrutinize.14  The tactic can be easily adapted by a court-supervised 
or independent authority to generate information about public bureaucracies. The 
defining feature of this technique is its rejection of an implicit assumption that a given 
degree of review stringency should be applied to all cases in a class.  Despite their 
minimize the subtleties of the variegated constitutional, statutory, and prudential doctrines on which courts 
(and even legislatures) draw when they decide on how much discretion to grant.  Separation of powers, 
deference to national security and foreign policy decisions, judicial deference to expert determinations of 
government agencies, and statutory interpretation techniques all figure in this process.  Even the two cases I 
cite here represent extraordinarily different contexts, and the kinds of discretion involved in the decision 
are also different.  The point here is how nearly any plausible applications of such doctrines require (or, at 
the very least, allow) some consequentialist balancing of the costs and benefits associated with discretion, 
and different ways of striking that balance are associated with distinct degrees of stringency in the court’s 
review of some executive decision.  As these two cases show, courts indeed strike different balances when 
applying these doctrines, and in the process, they set different degrees of stringency for the review of 
discretionary executive decisions.
11 See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Supreme Court of the United States, Heckler v. Chaney, 1984 
WL 566059, 4 (November 23, 1984)(“[R]espondents’ submission, if accepted, would allow anyone to seek 
judicial review of the agency’s decision not to bring enforcement proceedings under any portion of the 
Act.”)(emphasis added); Brief for the Respondents, Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 724020,  12 (March 29, 2004)(arguing that further factual development of the 
circumstances surrounding an alleged enemy combatant’s designation as such “would divert the military’s 
attention from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan…”).
12 Moralistic intuitions about the importance horizontal equity combine with the content of legal doctrines 
such as stare decisis to complicate the possibility of using differing degrees of stringency to review cases in 
the same class.  See infra Part I.b.
13 See infra Part I.c.
14 See id.
6relative absence from discussions of how to constrain government discretion, audits of 
this kind are familiar from a panoply of private and public sector contexts.  By providing
an alternative to imposing a single stringency standard across the board, audits can 
disrupt the familiar, repetitive debate about whether society deserves greater judicial
protection of its rights and prerogatives.  Put differently, even if one accepts the executive 
branch’s strident (and often questionable) assertions that the sky would fall if discretion 
were more easily reviewed in court, there remains a viable option for assessing that 
discretion without incurring the various costs associated with traditional judicial review. 
Nor would audits merely duplicate, in a different form, what judicial review could 
already achieve.  Under quite reasonable assumptions, deferential judicial review may be
worse from a prescriptive standpoint than review using audits even though the costs may 
be similar.  The absence of audits, conversely, diminishes our system’s capacity to detect 
executive branch manipulation.15  It may also dampen the incentives of executive branch 
bureaucracies to learn from their mistakes, and makes it easy for key actors in the system 
to avoid articulating (either in statutory or executive mandates) what standards are 
actually supposed to govern executive discretion.  Together these dynamics ultimately 
affect the costs and benefits of laws that grant the executive branch discretion in the first 
place, and also the political context governing those grants of legal power.  The 
information on bureaucratic performance generated by audits could even dynamically 
influence courts deciding how stringently to review government action, or whether such 
action comports with procedural due process norms.16  Ultimately, audits may also exert 
an impact on the political context shaping the allocation of power to government.  In 
principle, that context should reflect an accountability-power trade-off, where political 
audiences may prove willing to see the executive branch get more power but only if it 
could be reliably supervised.  While the devil may be in the details, Part II surveys some 
of these problems and discusses how they might be plausibly resolved.
Part III then relaxes the assumption that judicial review is the only institutional 
mechanism generating information about executive discretion.  It examines the behavior 
of two sets of actors capable of producing the sort of accountability-enhancing 
information that intrusive judicial review can.  The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) and the Inspectors General (IG) offices, which might be termed “audit 
bureaucracies,” possess a broad mandate to audit federal government activities and 
produce information about how laws are implemented.  Although they operate in a 
complex political environment shaped by the legislature and the executive branch, they 
are not subject to the constraints that ostensibly lead courts to fashion stringency 
standards applying across the board to all potential cases in a particular class.  Similarly, 
15
 Of course, the mere creation of some auditing system does not automatically solve organizational 
learning and accountability problems involving the law.  As noted in Part II, a great deal depends on details 
of institutional design.  The impact of an audit system also depends on the public’s response, and the 
institutional dynamics affecting that response.  Audit systems can be counterproductive if they merely 
provide a false sense of security – which is in some sense precisely my criticism of judicial review in many 
of the contexts I discuss in this paper.  Nonetheless, the status quo seems even more likely to provide 
precisely that false sense of security because it lacks many of the potential advantages that a carefully-
structured audit system could generate.  For a thoughtful discussion of the role of audits and the pitfalls in 
designing them, see MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1999).
16 See infra Part II.b (discussing the potential for dynamic interaction between audits and judicial review).
7the legislature itself can use its investigative powers directly to generate information 
about how executive discretion is exercised.
Yet audits of executive discretion generally are not a feature of modern 
governance.  Amidst the swirl of budget votes in Congress, committee hearings, GAO 
investigations of FBI computers, and IG reports on immigration policy, neither 
legislatures nor the audit bureaucracies focus on systematically auditing executive 
discretion.17  As Part IV indicates, the relative absence of sampling techniques may reflect 
conceptual blurring of the direct remedy and information-producing remedies that bedevil 
courts, and probably lead courts to under-use the sampling methodologies that some 
judges have cautiously deployed in class actions and government fraud cases.  In 
addition, legislators and organized interests, like the executive branch itself, may lack 
incentives to deploy audits or analogous sampling methodologies.  This pattern of neglect 
predictably affects how legislatures bargain over executive power and review the 
consequences of those bargains.  It also affects how legislative goals percolate through 
the audit bureaucracies, drawing their attention to procurement fraud and similarly 
tangible examples of waste.  Second, to the extent that the audit bureaucracies retain 
some autonomy to allocate their resources, they appear to remain in the thrall of their 
initial role as financial auditors and the more-recently acquired role of auditor of 
government performance that nonetheless generally fails to encompass sampling.  While 
this picture is not immediately encouraging, it does suggest that as audit bureaucracies 
expand their autonomy, they may be able to entice a constituency to value audits of 
executive discretion if agency leaders choose to pursue such a goal. 
Even in the face of such efforts to enhance the organizational autonomy of the 
audit bureaucracies, the preceding factors may nonetheless continue locking in 
suboptimal institutional responses to serious legal problems.  This case study and thought 
experiment therefore aims to highlight three crucial challenges that follow from that sort 
of lock-in: (1) the importance of recognizing the inherent limitations of traditional 
judicial review as a means of managing government discretion, (2) the value of 
envisioning new institutional designs to manage discretion more effectively, and (3) the 
need for reasonable strategies to implement those designs in a politically complicated 
world.  In response to those challenges, this article seeks to broaden the scope of potential 
solutions and shed light on the forces that shape public perceptions of whether those 
solutions even exist.
I.
THE LOGIC OF AUDITING EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
It is commonplace for scholars and policymakers to extol the role of judicial 
institutions in ensuring that rights are respected, that agencies do not exceed their legal 
powers, and that the law is correctly applied.18 Legislators have bolstered the judicial 
17
 As Part I.c explains, this means that the audit bureaucracies generally appear not to: (1) take random 
samples of decisions (2) in an important legal domain where decisions directly affect individuals or groups, 
(3) assess those decisions in accordance with a defensible standard and announce the results to the public.
18 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the Constitutional 
Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21 (1998), and sources cited supra at 
note 1.
8role over the years by enacting procedural controls, such as those contained in the 
Administrative Procedure Act, enhancing their ability to assert control over the 
bureaucracy and limiting the scope of executive discretion.19
Despite these developments, court review of executive decisions is sometimes 
exceedingly modest, or entirely missing.20  The pattern recurs in domains involving both 
national security and more traditional domestic administrative action. Sometimes 
legislators explicitly confer enormous discretion, prohibiting all or most judicial review 
of certain decisions, by embedding a limiting provision in an agency’s legal mandate.  
The law says that the CIA Director, for instance, has authority to fire employees for being 
national security risks.  It also says he has the power to define what “national security 
risk” means, which lets him arbitrarily fire someone for being gay (he has).21  In other 
cases, executive agencies have discretionary powers because prevailing statutory 
interpretations and constitutional provisions imply the existence of such power.  Courts 
have recursively found that prosecutors harbor an inherent power to choose whom to 
charge with few (if any) judicially-imposed constraints.22  In still other cases agencies 
have discretionary power because courts and other external observers review certain 
kinds of executive decisions with great deference, which leaves the president, the 
agencies he supervises, and similar executive authorities with residual control over 
governance.23  The resulting degree of executive discretion lets agencies act swiftly in 
domains where they hold responsibility, learn to deal with unfamiliar situations, and 
leverage their expertise.24
Yet discretion’s two-edged nature constantly reiterates the prescriptive question 
of how best to render accountable the executive bureaucracies wielding such power.  This 
Part explains why audits of discretionary decisions should play a prominent role in 
answering that question. 
A.  How Executive Discretion is Pervasive
i.  Overview and Definitions
19 See generally, McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.ECON. & 
ORG. 180 (1999); Peter L.  Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1389 (1996).
20
 Even when all or most alternative review is precluded, courts can restrain egregious government conduct 
of some kinds, such as those that might give rise to viable constitutional tort claims.  See Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).  But courts proceed 
with extreme caution in this realm given their concern that the scope of a claim they recognize (and the 
remedies they might make available) would interfere with some of the more valuable properties associated 
with executive discretion.  See generally PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR 
OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983).
21
 Webster, 486 U.S. at 602-04.
22
 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).  As Davis cogently observed, “[a] judicial trial is an 
acceptance of a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute, not a review of it.  Even a quick finding of not guilty 
may leave untouched the harms that flow from the prosecution.”  Davis, supra note 1, at 209 n.21.
23 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
24 See Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 
YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001); John C. Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 793 (2004).
9For present purposes, discretion can be defined as the extent of legal flexibility to 
use government power vested in executive branch officials – including, but not limited to, 
personnel, budgets, information, and legally-sanctioned coercive authority to affect the 
world.25  Distinctions in the amount of executive discretion are relative, not absolute. 
Government officials exercise a certain measure of discretion virtually every time they do 
something.  Though government actions are rarely purely discretionary, neither is 
discretion ever entirely absent.  The distinctions that lawyers and policymakers fight over 
tend to be about whether to give the executive branch relatively more, or relatively less
discretion compared to a certain baseline.  
Courts and commentators have long acknowledged the importance of some 
deviations from that baseline.  Thus, while the classic case of Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park v. Volpe firmly establishes close judicial scrutiny of a discretionary 
decision as a presumptive means of policing executive decisions,26 other cases among the 
administrative law canon make an equally compelling case for a greater measure of 
discretion.  In some cases the Court famously recognized the existence of domains of 
government authority best left, for structural reasons, entirely to the political branches.27
A somewhat different form of discretion is the subject of Heckler v. Chaney,28 where the 
Court considered the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny of a regulatory agency’s 
discretionary enforcement decisions, and emphasized the value of limiting judicial 
intervention in such matters by analogizing regulatory enforcement discretion to 
prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context.29  It is this form of targeted discretion to 
directly affect individuals and groups that most resembles the “executive discretion” with 
which this article is concerned.  As many commentators have acknowledged, preserving 
the type of prosecutorial discretion at issue in Heckler from judicial intervention raises 
the risk that executive authorities will behave in an arbitrary fashion.30
When lawyers advocating on behalf of executive power extol the value of such
Heckler-type executive discretion, they nonetheless tend to implicitly accept a baseline 
25
 One could imagine, in contrast, a different type of discretion, understood to require by definition –
perhaps for political reasons – the absence of review.  Efforts to subject this sort of discretion, associated 
(for instance) with the political question doctrine, to review would be (by definition) ill-advised.  
Nonetheless, one of the goals of the discussion that follows is to highlight the value of being more explicit 
about why certain types of discretionary decisions should be entirely insulated from review. 
26
 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
27 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).  As I acknowledge below, 
perhaps there are indeed some contexts where discretion does (and ought to) mean no review -- from 
courts, auditors, or anyone else.  My suggestion is simply that we ought to proceed with great caution in 
considering the rationales for that kind of discretion.  In particular, we ought to recognize that the rationales 
for limiting or even barring judicial review in some contexts do not necessarily speak to the question of 
whether we should also bar an alternative form of review.  Put differently, perhaps one might envision an 
array of review mechanisms to address the fact that the two kinds of discretion are on a continuum, and at 
intermediate places on the continuum we might do well to use audits (or some other system of review) 
instead of leaving the executive unrestrained.
28 470 U.S. at 821.
29
 The analogy bolstered the Court’s case for limiting judicial interference in the Heckler context (involving 
the Food and Drug Administration) because the perception was already so deeply-rooted among courts that 
judicial regulation of prosecutorial discretion would unduly burden the administration of justice.  Cf.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 664 (1978).
30 See infra note __.
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state of the world where courts play a significant role in reviewing government action.31
Such recognition of the value of judicial supervision is a familiar one in the United States 
and in most other developed nations (and many developing ones).32  In criminal 
prosecutions, voting rights cases, and labor law injunctions, for example, the completion 
of some action of the executive branch (such as subjecting someone to the detriments 
associated with being convicted of a crime) is conditioned on judicial approval.  
Observers and policymakers may have different political views about how easy it should 
be to impose a labor injunction (for example) or convict someone of a crime.  But if they 
fail in persuading the legislature to water down the substantive standard that applies, 
advocates of discretion are left to mount a vigorous case before a court that is quite 
persistently unwilling to simply defer to executive discretion.  Even when such review 
does not occur in advance of government action, the executive branch presumably labors 
in the shadow of the embarrassing possibility that a license grant, a regulatory rule, a 
criminal conviction, or a statutory enactment will be subsequently invalidated.33  This 
implies that we can measure the benefits of executive discretion against a baseline of 
relatively intrusive judicial review.  
ii.  Examples
31 See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 
724020 (March 29, 2004).  The government’s language in the brief is typical of the positions that lawyers 
for the executive branch have taken in this Administration – and not dramatically different (on the core 
issue of deference – from that taken by lawyers for other presidential administrations.  It states:
As this Court has observed, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority 
of the Executive in military and national security affairs.  The customary deference that courts 
afford the Executive in matters of military affairs is especially warranted in this context.  A 
commander’s wartime determination that an individual is an enemy combatant is a 
quintessentially military judgment, representing a core exercise of the Commander-in-Chief 
authority.  Especially in the course of hostilities, the military through its operations and 
intelligence-gathering has an unmatched vantage point from which to learn about the enemy and 
make judgments as to whether those seized during a conflict are friend or foe. 
Id. at 25-26 (citations omitted).
32
 This statement should not obscure the massive extent of variation among legal systems, many of which 
assign quite different roles to judicial institutions.  The point is that it’s quite common for those different 
systems to assign considerable importance to the goal of reviewing executive action through courts.  See 
generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 
101 (1994).
33 Actually measuring the precise impact of review with some analytical clarity is enormously complex, but 
a number of scholars have made convincing arguments to this effect using qualitative or quantitative 
methodologies in different contexts.  For some cogent examples, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID HARFST, 
THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990)(suggesting that NHTSA’s reliance on costly recalls of 
questionable safety effects rather than prospective rulemaking has in part been driven by the impact of 
intrusive judicial review in rulemaking); Thomas O. McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in 
Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1998)(discussing the impact of the 
“ossification” of rulemaking, where judicial review among other factors shapes agencies’ willingness to use 
regulatory authority); Brandice Canes-Wrone, Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower 
Courts, 47 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 205 (2003)(analyzing whether changes in the ideological composition of lower 
courts affected decisions of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to grant permits for development of 
wetlands, and finding that a standard deviation increase in estimated pro-environmental ideology of the 
lower courts decreased the probability that the Corps would grant a permit by 14%).
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To better assess the potential benefits and costs of departing from a baseline of 
intrusive judicial review, we should first analyze how executive authorities may use their 
discretion in a few specific contexts arising in both national security and domestic 
regulatory enforcement. Consider, for instance, the following examples.
1.  Asset Freezing – Under current law, government officials have powerful tools 
to regulate the economic activities of foreign persons.  One such tool, involving 
designations under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (or “IEEPA”),34
lets the president “block,” or freeze access to, any property subject to United States 
jurisdiction, when two conditions apply.  First, the property in question must be 
something in which a foreign country or national has an interest.35  This constraint turns 
out not to be much of a limitation on the president’s power, since courts have found that 
the “foreign” interest does not have to be a legal interest of any kind.  The mere fact that 
an American organization has foreign beneficiaries may be enough, in fact, for a court to 
say that it has a “foreign interest.”36 Second, the president must use this power only 
during an emergency.37  This is not much of a limitation, either.  The “unusual and 
extraordinary threat” giving rise to the emergency must have its source partly outside the 
United States.38  It must pose a threat to the “national security, foreign policy, or 
economy of the United States.”39  Given the combined effect of this expansive language 
and traditional judicial deference on matters of national security and foreign affairs, 
presidents have found it relatively easy to declare emergencies under the law (about ten 
of which are currently in effect).40  Courts have yet to find, under the terms of IEEPA, 
that a supposed emergency does not exist.
In a series of executive orders, the President has delegated much of his authority 
under IEEPA to the Secretaries of State and Treasury.  Under the resulting system, the 
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control blocks the assets of groups that branded 
“Specially Designated Terrorist Organizations.”41  Once a group becomes a specially 
designated terrorist organization, it loses control over its fate.  The impact of OFAC’s 
orders is to block the organization’s funds, regardless of where in the financial system 
they happen to be.  Each violation of the blocking orders can trigger a separate civil fine 
of up to $10,000, and willful violators are subject to criminal penalties, including up to 
ten years’ imprisonment and fines of up to $50,000 per violation.42  A similar designation 
also triggers severe criminal penalties punishing individuals for providing “material 
34
 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 et seq (“IEEPA”).  See generally 
James J. Savage, Executive Use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act – Evolution Through 
the Terrorist and Taliban Sanctions, 10 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 28 (2001).
35 Id.
36 See Global Relief Fdn. V. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
37 See IEEPA, supra note 70.
38 See Holy Land Fdn. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
39 Id.
40 See generally Jason Luong, Note, Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (2000).
41
 333 F.3d at 160.
42
 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2004).
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support” (including funds and in-kind economic contributions such as lodging) to 
designated terrorist organizations.43
Take a closer look at how a court reviews the government’s designations. In the 
recent Holy Land Foundation case, the State and Treasury departments used their 
delegated presidential IEEPA powers to freeze the assets of the Holy Land Foundation.44
Court review of the blocking order considered whether it was “arbitrary and capricious” 
under the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act.  But given the national security 
context of the decision, the reviewing district and appellate courts also interpreted the 
relevant law to require a highly deferential form of review.  The District Court, for 
example, emphasized the limited scope of its role.  The key factual question, the District 
Court and the litigants agreed, was the extent of HLF’s connection to Hamas, another 
specially designated terrorist organization (and one that, at least at this point, few people 
had reason to doubt as a “terrorist organization”).  The district court conducted a careful 
examination of the record and uncovered “ample” evidence that:
(1) HLF has had financial connects to Hamas since its creation in 1989; (2) HLF 
leaders have been actively involved in various meetings with Hamas leaders; (3) 
HLF funds Hamas-controlled charitable organizations; (4) HLF provides financial 
support to the orphans and families of Hamas martyrs and prisoners; (5) HLF’s 
Jerusalem office acted on behalf of Hamas; and (6) FBI informants reliably 
reported that HLF funds Hamas.45
The D.C. Circuit upheld this determination on appeal.46 In doing so, the court 
legitimized a review process that arguably renders administrable the federal 
government’s web of emergency economic regulatory powers. That process might also 
strike some observers as particularly thorough.  But whatever one’s views about the 
former issue, the latter perception is mistaken, for at least two reasons.  First, the court 
considers only whether the decision was “arbitrary and capricious,” and based on 
“substantial evidence,” not whether it was right or wrong.  That determination, moreover, 
reflects a statutory text (the APA and IEEPA) and tradition that makes the court’s inquiry 
extremely deferential and perhaps helps explain why so few of these determinations get 
challenged in court (because it’s not clear what will be gained).  Second, as a practical 
matter, the court’s inquiry (even where, as in Holy Land, the district court pushes the 
envelope in terms of the stringency of its review) begins and ends with the record that the 
government itself compiles.  As the district court itself noted in this case, the arbitrary 
and capricious standard “does not allow the courts to undertake their own fact-finding, 
but [instead only allows the court] to review the agency’s record to determine whether the 
agency’s decision was supported by a rational basis.”47  That record may be a 
tremendously accurate complication of the government’s evidence.  Or it may be patently 
misleading.  Nothing requires the government to report evidence tending to cast doubt on 
43 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
44
 333 F.3d at 159-60.
45
 333 F.3d at 161.
46
 333 F.3d at 161-63.
47 See Holy Land, 219 F.Supp.2d at 67.
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its contentions.48  Nor does the court interview the sources on which the record is based.  
Which means that, even in the best of circumstances, the court’s review is only as good 
as the record.
The flip side of this point is that court review is likely to exert only a limited 
impact on the quality of that record.  A court will vacate the designation if the record in 
question turns out to be an empty folder.  On the other hand, officials who want to evade 
that possibility need only make sure there is a thick enough record to make it hard for the 
court to conclude that such a record makes the designation look totally arbitrary.  Yet the 
record itself is based on decisions that are essentially immune from review.49
2.  No-Fly Lists –When passengers check in at American airports, their names 
generally are compared to those on a list provided to airlines by the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA).50  Predictably enough, the point of the list is to thwart the 
(travel) plans of those who might prove dangerous on board a flight.51 Although TSA 
initially denied the existence of this list (technically an element of a system known as 
CAPPS I), subsequent disclosures establish that  TSA considers an important component 
of aviation security even in light of recent efforts to supplement it with a more elaborate 
system.52
Yet TSA and the airlines have run into a spate of difficulties using the list.  
Sometimes people whose names are merely similar to those on the list are detained.  
Some individuals actually named on the list are virtually never completely denied the 
chance to fly; they are instead detained, at times forced to miss their flight, and subjected 
48
 Ironically enough, the Holy Land appeals panel suggested that the government’s position was 
strengthened by the fact that “there was no plausible evidence presented which showed that [ties to Hamas] 
had been severed.” 333 F.3d at 162.
49
 Manipulation of the record, moreover, need not be conscious or explicit.  A number of pressures and 
considerable number of investigators, analysts, spies, lawyers, and higher level officials whose work 
influences the record that the court reviews.  As long as they feel at least some subtle pressure to support 
the conclusion that a designation should be made, they may fail to consider countervailing arguments, or 
the potential consequences of an “erroneous” designation (i.e., erroneous in the sense of not complying 
with the statute, the president’s executive order, the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, or the executive 
branch’s stated goals for using the IEEPA emergency powers)].
50 See Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening 
System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges, GAO 04-385 (Feb. 2004)(“GAO Report”).
51
 A subsidiary purpose may also be to promote the questioning and apprehension of suspicious individuals 
who may be sought by law enforcement authorities.
52 See generally Green v. TSA, 351 F.Supp.2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2005). See also GAO Report, supra note 
86, at 9.  For developments since February 2004, see Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: 
Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System is Further 
Developed, GAO-05- 356 (March 2005). The agency has been rushing to implement a long-delayed new 
system, since shortly after September 11, but the process has proven fraught with delays. See EPIC v. Dep’t 
of Homeland Security, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2005 WL 1745303 (July 25, 2005). For developments since 
February 2004, see Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and 
Testing Under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System is Further Developed, GAO-05-356 (March 
2005). The agency has been rushing to implement a long-delayed new system, since shortly after 
September 11, but the process has proven fraught with delays. The advent of the new system, however, is 
unlikely to lead to the complete demise of some version of the current process, as the government will 
likely retain a “core” list of people who should be detained when they attempt to travel.  See also GAO 
Report, supra note __, at 9.
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to extensive questioning.53  Even assuming some of the problems with the list’s use could 
be remedied, it would seem as though there should be some procedure to police the list, 
so that people who are erroneously placed there could be taken off.  
Nothing of the sort appears to exist.54  Instead, people who plainly should not be 
on the list are bewildered to learn that they cannot even find out how their name appeared 
on the list, let alone what must be done to remove it.55  A member of the Air Force 
reporting for duty found his name on the list.  A mother checking in at Dulles Airport for 
a flight to Italy discovered her gurgling nine-month old son’s name was on the list, which 
prevented the desk agent from printing out a boarding pass.56  TSA may be 
understandably reluctant to reveal the quality of its methods and sources, either because it 
seeks to avoid sensitizing potential terrorists to the extent of their strengths or alerting the 
larger public to the extent of their weaknesses.  But that still leaves the question of how 
the quality of the list will be policed, particularly given the apparent absence of any 
reliable, consistent review mechanism to ensure the names on the list belong there.57
Reasonable people can differ with respect to how much discretion TSA should
have in deciding what information to consider in administering the list.  What is harder to 
deny is the absence of any specific statutory provision to resolve disputes about the 
propriety of placing a person’s name on the list.58 Efforts to persuade a court that that the 
TSA’s decision to place a name on the list was “arbitrary and capricious,” moreover, 
would encounter the same problems associated with the blocking of assets, where courts 
have apply an exceedingly deferential standard that essentially fails to encompass review 
of how the agency obtained the information that allegedly supports its determination.59
This leaves aggrieved parties with the option of a lawsuit claiming that their treatment as 
a result of being placed on the list amounts to a due process violation.60 Regardless of the 
outcome, the no-fly list illustrates why due process claims may be a poor vehicle for 
policing this type of discretion.  Assuming the litigants persuade a court that the problems 
they confront while flying amount to an interference with a protected liberty or (less 
likely) property interest, they would still have to persuade a court that existing procedures 
53 See GAO Report, supra note __, at 13.
54 See id. (discussing the absence of internal verification systems in TSA-administered passenger 
prescreening programs); id. at 36-38 (indicating how GAO did not itself audit names placed on the list as 
part of its methodology).
55
 Some individuals apparently on the list who write their congressional representative have been told to 
bring along multiple forms of identification to prove they are not the person named on the list.  This 
obviously does not address the problem of the person actually named on the list who seeks to contest that 
designation.  Individuals who write TSA may also obtain a letter that is supposed to mitigate the impact of 
being found on the list.  But presentation of the letter to airline or TSA authorities at the airport is no 
guarantee that a person whose name appears on the list will be allowed to travel.  See Drees, supra note __.
56
 Caroline Drees, U.S. No-Fly List Vexes Travelers From Babies On Up, REUTERS ONLINE, (Dec. 19, 
2005), avail. at. http://today.reuters.com/news/newsarticle.aspx type=domesticNews&storyid=2005-12-
15T151246Z_01_SIB554549_RTRUKOC_0_US-SECURITY-NOFLY.xml&rpc=22 (last accessed Dec. 
19, 2005)(observing how the suspected nine-month old terrorist “sat there and gurgled,” and noting that the 
list apparently includes Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Don Young among others).
57 See GAO Report, supra note 86, at 13.
58
 Persons may complain to an ombudsperson or directly to the agency, but there is no administrative 
mechanism to resolve such complaints.
59
 An arbitrary and capricious claim would also confront an additional hurdle in this context, 
60 Such a lawsuit is currently pending.
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violate the interest-balancing test rooted in Mathews v. Eldridge.61  That would be a 
tough sell given the strength of the interest the government would assert in promoting 
aviation security.  Which leaves the quality of the list dependent on the bureaucracy’s 
behavior.
3.  Environmental and Occupational Safety Administrative Compliance Orders –
By subjecting individuals to severe practical and reputational consequences, harsh 
criminal indictments may operate as discretionary sanctions.  But individuals and 
organizations tend to face formal punishments in the criminal justice system only after 
they are convicted or admit their guilt.  Statutes creating major regulatory programs 
reflect a different premise.  Many such laws allow regulators to levy fines or issue orders 
restricting certain activities with more limited court intervention.  Although they vary in 
the relevant legal standard or the size of the maximum fine, those orders can have an 
effect before judicial intervention.  Even after that intervention, it is not clear how well 
the stringency of review provided by courts (which tends to conform to some variation of 
the “arbitrary and capricious” or “abuse of discretion” standards) strikes the most 
desirable balance between restraining abuse and providing regulatory flexibility.
For instance, when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
or its contractors has some reason to think businesses are violating their general duty to 
provide a safe working environment, the agency can issue abatement orders and 
citations.62  Although parties may (and often do) contest citations, doing so is expensive, 
which means some parties just pay the relatively meager fines OSHA tends to assess 
instead of contesting them.  Penalties for violating compliance orders are considerably 
more severe under environmental statutes, like the Clean Air Act.63  Under that statute, 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can issue an Administrative Compliance 
Order (ACO) on the basis of “any information available to it,” directing a regulated party 
– such as an electricity generation plant – or state agency to comply with the Clean Air 
Act’s requirements.  While the ACO does not allow EPA to impose fines or other 
penalties directly, the order triggers provisions imposing civil or criminal penalties for 
violation of the order.64  Under the terms of the Act, it initially appeared as though 
judicial review of an ACO was supposed to focus on whether the regulated party violated 
the terms of the order, not whether the EPA was right to issue it in the first place.65  This 
has understandably raised questions about how the order itself should be reviewed.  In 
recent cases, the Supreme Court and several circuit courts have left some uncertainty 
about whether the ACO structure withstands constitutional scrutiny given its due process 
implications.  At least one circuit has found ACOs not to be final agency actions, thereby 
rendering them unreviewable and raising the due process problem.66  The Supreme Court 
declined to review this case, and instead – in a separate case – upheld a Ninth Circuit 
61 See Green, 351 F.Supp 2d. at 1124-7 (denying due process challenge to the no-fly list from passengers 
who had been detained but eventually allowed to fly).
62 See 29 U.S.C. §§664(a), 666(a), 666(b), and 666(c).
63
 Clean Air Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) and (c)(2000).  For a detailed discussion, see generally Jason D. Nichols, 
Towards Reviving the Efficacy of Administrative Compliance Orders: Balancing Due Process Concerns 
and the Need for Enforcement Flexibility in Environmental Law, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 193 (2005).
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2).
66 See TVA v. Whitman, 226 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003).
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opinion holding ACOs to be final agency actions and reviewing them under the “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard.67
Both contexts leave the agencies considerable discretion to impose compliance 
orders.  OSHA obviously has it when it issues citations and abatement orders, some of 
which are not challenged subsequently.  Even if arbitrary and capricious review is not as 
deferential in this context is it is with asset freezes, it still leaves the court applying a 
fairly deferential standard of review to a decision that can be based on “any available 
information.”  It is quite plausible that the extent of resulting stringency in review is a 
reasonable compromise if the standard is going to be applied across the board, to every 
compliance order.  It is also quite possible that such review will not say much about the 
quality of compliance order decisions, which could (or perhaps should) ultimately affect 
the extent of confidence in the regulatory structures.  Put differently, more exhaustive 
review of regulatory decisions to impose compliance orders could change the bundle of 
substantive powers and penalties that could be acceptable to an enacting legislative and 
interest group coalition.
* * *
The preceding examples demonstrate the limits of judicial scrutiny for certain
vital government functions.  Indeed, even the availability of substantive review can 
conceal vast reservoirs of bureaucratic flexibility.  A host of other domains – varying in 
the availability of formal review but not in the fact that they leave authorities with 
discretion – pose similar problems.  Such domains involve, among others, the impact of 
prosecutors’ charging decisions on suspects, the meager judicial scrutiny of discretion 
vested government contractors engaged in quasi-official functions,68 the enormous power 
federal officials wield (even in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions on the 
subject) in designating enemy combatants,69 and even in the myriad decisions governing
federal procurement predicated on the exercise of government officials’ legal 
discretion.70  How, then, should courts and legislatures react if they consider the existing 
degree of external scrutiny to be inadequate?
B.  How Discretion Is Routinely Managed Through Variations in the Stringency of Court 
Review
The answer is not, obviously, to maximally limit discretion, something courts and 
legislatures are understandably loath to do.  Instead, judges and lawmakers tend to 
manage the costs and benefits of discretion by varying the stringency of review that is 
supposed to apply to the actions of the executive or her agent.  Whether courts are driven 
to do this by anodyne judicial prudence or rigid legislative mandates, they review some 
67 See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation V. EPA, 53 U.S. 1186 (2003); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2002).
68 See generally Gillian Metzger, Privatization As Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003).  See also
Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, 
Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549 (2005).
69 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19.
70 See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 165 (2000)(noting that, despite 
the “highly technocratic approach to contract design” prevalent in federal procurement law, the existing 
framework is “too limited to address the much more substantial issues that arise” in some contracts).
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decisions more stringently, and others less so.71  Even decisions putatively subject to the 
same standard of review, such as the familiar arbitrary and capricious touchstone 
enshrined in the Administrative Procedure Act, may end up being reviewed with different 
degrees of stringency.  The distinctions presumably reflect courts’ judgments about when 
the costs of added scrutiny are justified.72  Thus, judges and scholars generally take 
arbitrary and capricious review to mean one thing (milder review) for a typical informal 
adjudication, such as deciding whether a vehicle fits standards permitting to enter a 
national forest, and another (more stringent review) when courts are reviewing an 
intricate regulatory rule governing the licensing of nuclear reactors.73
Stringency of review is what distinguishes these two different versions of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard, and more generally, what differentiates government 
decisions that receive greater judicial scrutiny from those that get less.  The term is meant 
to serve as an abbreviated reference to the mixture of doctrines governing such 
distinctions in the strictness of review applied to an agency’s factual or prescriptive 
conclusions in a given decision.  Stringency includes, among other things, the standard of 
review governing appeals of specific administrative actions.  It is affected by the degree 
of outright deference given to the executive branch, and the extent to which courts find 
through constitutional or statutory interpretation that a particular decision to be 
committed by law to agency discretion.  More stringency can imply more rigorous 
procedures (such as those that might be imposed on due process groups) that the 
government must follow before imposing a cost on someone, a less permissive standard 
of review for the factual findings of executive branch agencies (or lower courts), and less 
overall deference to the government’s decision itself.  
Thus, when a court determines that a six-page declaration from an official 
ensconced beneath layers of the Defense Department bureaucracy is enough reason to 
detain someone for an indefinite period of time, it is being more deferential.74  When a 
court decides such justification is insufficient, because the executive must provide a 
“meaningful opportunity” for someone so designated to get notice of the factual basis for 
their detention and to contest their status, it is being less deferential.75  When a court says 
that a person cannot be detained (given the legislature’s current authorization) unless 
someone is charged with a crime, it is auguring to provide review that is even more 
71
 For cases, see supra note 6.
72
 Indeed, casual observers may be forgiven for assuming (heroically) that courts (or legislatures, when they 
directly impose limits on review) are balancing the marginal costs and benefits of greater stringency of 
review.  See infra Part I.c.ii for a discussion.
73 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION - SECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
PRACTICE, A BLACKLETTER STATEMENT OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 34 (2004).  The Blacketter 
Statement provides a cogent and revealing synthesis:
The court may set aside an agency action as an abuse of discretion… on any of several grounds.  
In practice, application of these grounds varies according to the nature and magnitude of the aency 
action.  Thus, a court will typically apply the criteria rigorously during judicial review of high-
stakes rulemaking proceedings (a practice commonly termed “hard look” review), but much more 
leniently when reviewing a routine, uncomplicated action.  [Emphasis added].
74 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003).
75 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
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stringent.76 Though specific cases may involve different doctrinal bases and legal 
subtleties, the important distinction is not in the specific doctrines or procedures 
involved.  It is in the fact that under a standard of greater deference, whether caused by 
legislative enactments or subsequent judicial interpretation, some executive bureaucracy
retains greater power to decide how to use its discretion.  
Decisions about review stringency, moreover, follow a certain convention.  When 
deciding how much of that power to let executive authorities keep, courts and legislators 
tend to implicitly assume that a particular degree of stringency in review will apply, once 
articulated (and assuming it is actually followed) across the board to all similarly-situated 
cases.77  In fact courts treat horizontal equity as an important value, where deviations 
must be defended.78  The same goes for virtually all the legislative mandates that courts 
implement.   The move to privilege horizontal equity in judicial review is the essence of 
traditional judicial review.79  Its rationale may be grounded in an appreciation for stare 
decisis, or perhaps resides in an inflated conception of judicial power to ensure that like 
cases are treated similarly.  Predictably, the desire for horizontal equity in standards 
governing the stringency of review renders troubling (at least in the eyes of many 
principled observers) the prospect of increasing the stringency of review in a particular 
case.  A decision to increase review stringency in a single case is taken to cast a long 
shadow on all similar decisions in the relevant pool of cases, and prohibitively increasing 
the associated costs in terms of the direct burdens of review and the forgone benefits of 
discretion.
C.  Audits Can Substitute For, or Supplement, Judicial Review
Suppose now that those allegedly prohibitive costs, or their related administrative 
complications, preclude extensive supervision of executive discretion through judicial 
review.  To fill the gap, some observers may rely on heroic conceptions of the political 
process, or the media.  But each of these mechanisms depends in large measure on 
information about the nature and quality of executive decisionmaking.  Politicians and 
76
 No doubt the decision to require a criminal charge in such a context affects more than just how judicial 
institutions review executive determinations.  The claim here is merely that one dimension along with there 
is a contrast between (for example) use of the criminal justice system and enemy combatant designations 
involves the role of court review. 
77 See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983)(noting, in the context of reviewing an alleged 
retaliatory demotion and defamation claim against a federal official, that “[t]he costs associated with the 
review of disciplinary decisions are already significant – not only in monetary terms, but also in the time 
and energy of managerial personnel who must defend their decisions”).  See also Langevin v. Chenango 
Ct., Inc. 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971)(finding that judicial review of the Federal Housing Agency’s 
discretionary actions resulting in rent increase approvals in part on the basis that an unacceptably high 
number of rent increases would be subject to review).  Here and in similar cases, the Court’s discussion of 
costs implicitly assumes that whatever costs are generated by the stringency of review the court adopts in 
the present case will be applied to future cases with similar characteristics.  See supra note 7 for examples 
of briefs making this argument.
78 See Cole, supra note 1, at 2567.
79
 The reference to “traditional judicial review” implies that executive decisions can be reviewed through 
judicial fora, where judges tend to believe that court decisions governing how stringent is the review of 
discretionary executive decisions will affect every future case (or nearly so) in a particular class, and where
litigants seek, and the court can deliver, some kind of relief, such as vacating a particular government 
action or providing an injunctive remedy.
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the media sometimes have reason to generate that information through investigations that 
may turn up some potentially useful tidbit of executive malfeasance (from their 
perspective).  There is no compelling reason to think that these erstwhile investigators 
will routinely face sufficient incentives to investigate, which is why observers assign 
such relative importance to judicial review as a means of generating information with the 
potential to provoke political and journalistic responses.80  Even the otherwise laudable 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is no reliable bulwark against bureaucratic 
misconduct.  Such misconduct may afflict responses to FOIA requests in ways that are 
difficult for courts to monitor, and the law itself is riddled with exceptions.81 How else 
might legislators and the public undertake such supervision?
i.  Envisioning the Institutional Design of Audits of Executive Discretion
One answer can be found in what government organizations repeatedly do to the 
public: they audit. By thinking about alternative institutional arrangements, such as 
audits, it may possible to glean a better sense of the practical and political opportunities 
to nudge bureaucracies with discretionary legal powers away from failure.  Audits are not 
the only means of generating information about the exercise of discretion.82  Nonetheless, 
as will become clear, the exercise of designing an audit system also serves to clarify the 
consequentialist goals that are supposed to be served when discretion is reviewed.
As the term is used here, an audit of executive discretion is a sustained, careful 
evaluation of a discrete decision drawn from a larger pool.  Its aim is to uncover, for each 
reviewed case, whether a particular discretionary decision is in accord with some 
defensible standard grounded in public representations of the executive branch, implicit 
in statutes or constitutional doctrine, or defined by the auditor in advance.  In contrast to 
financial or more wide-ranging management audits, the audits of targeted executive 
discretion I discuss below treat each discretionary decision, like a decision to label a 
group as a specially designated terrorist organization, as the unit of analysis.  Audits of 
executive discretion would evaluate the information supporting the decision, its origins 
and reliability, contradictory information, and the broader context in which the decision 
took place.  Even in instances where the population of cases from which a sample could 
be drawn is relatively small, audits have the potential to “increase the information 
extracted from [an organization’s] own limited historical experience, by treating unique 
historical incidents as detailed stories rather than single data points.”83  Though existing 
audits rarely take precisely the form I suggest here, the basic idea of using audits to learn 
what’s going on in the world is neither mysterious nor rare.
80 See id. (discussing the role of judicial review in generating information that can galvanize political and 
journalistic responses to problematic executive branch discretionary decisions).
81 See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1195 (2004); Amy E. Rees, Note, Recent Developments Regarding the Freedom of 
Information Act: A “Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy or, Perhaps Both, 44 DUKE L.J. 1183 (1995).
82
 Robust ombuds systems, such as those used in Scandinavian countries, may represent another alternative.  
Nonetheless, if an ombuds system functioned as it is traditionally understood in being driven by public 
complaints, it would have some of the same strengths and weaknesses that the litigation process would, and 
would thereby provide a somewhat distorted picture of bureaucratic activity.  
83
 James G. March et al., Learning From Samples of One or Fewer, 2 ORGANIZ. SCI. 1, 2 (1991).
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Audits associated with taxation are among the most familiar.  They take place in 
some form in most reliable tax collection systems.84  Many tax audits are not entirely 
random, which reduces their ability to provide a reliable picture of public behavior.  The 
less random the audits are, the less generalizable their results – and the easier it might be 
to evade them by avoiding the behaviors that raise the probability of being audited.85
From this perspective, one of the “purest” tax auditing programs in recent years (in the 
sense of being almost entirely random) was the Internal Revenue Service’s Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program (or TCMP).  The following discussion emphasizes 
the tremendous informational value of such a program:
The last thorough tax gap study was for the year 1992, based on the 1988 TCMP.  
Noncompliance with individual and corporate income taxes was estimated to cost 
the Treasury about 18 percent of actual tax liability, which at 2002 levels of 
revenue would have amounted to $223 billion.  An average tax rate of 22 percent 
implies that there is about $1 trillion of unreported income and illegitimate 
deductions.86
Without TCMP audits, the federal government is unable to figure out the size of the “tax 
gap.”  The program’s cancellation has limited the government’s ability to know how 
much is paid relative to what is owed, and who is particularly likely to be responsible for 
that gap.87
Audits also show up in the pages of court opinions.  Suppose federal health care 
regulators and investigators suspect a health care clinic or nursing home of overcharging 
the federal government on Medicare payments.  The government sends in investigators.  
Instead of figuring out the amount the clinic owes by reviewing each one of its files, 
investigators occasionally use audits to calculate the amount.88  Courts reviewing this 
practice have repeatedly endorsed it, finding neither a conflict with the statute nor one 
with due process.89  “Sample audits” also make an occasional appearance in class actions.  
When they do, courts (and litigants) confronted with an entire class of claims take a 
sample of those claims to get a better sense of what’s going on.90
Something similar happens in the private sector, where “your call may be 
monitored for quality assurance.”  The point of such audits is not immediately to stop 
abuses or mistakes in discrete cases.  It is to enable greater learning about happens to the 
hundreds or thousands of individuals interacting with a company’s workers, and how 
those interactions can be improved.  Insurance companies sometimes perform a process 
of “closed file review,” where they spend more money figuring out whether the amount 
84 See generally JOEL SLEMROD AND JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 
OVER TAXES (2004).
85
 This last point is at the core of the explanation for why a “mixed strategy” is so valuable in the 
framework of game theory.  See DAVID A. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY, 381-83 (1993).
86
 Slemrod and Bakija, supra note 32, at 175.
87 Id. (“[T]he estimates are based on data that is now over fifteen years old.  But these are the best numbers 
around.”).
88 See Chaves Co. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914 (DC Cir. 1991).
89 Id. 
90 See, e.g., McComber v. Traveles Property & Casualty, Case No. X03CV990496761S, Superior Ct. of 
Conn. (Jud. Distr. Of New Britain)(May 26, 2004)(unpublished disposition).
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of money paid out for a particular insurance claim was correctly calculated than they do 
paying out the claim itself.91  It is not difficult to see why managers would rather know 
more about how their employees are performing.  Nor is it surprising that random audits 
(at least when they happen with a sufficiently high probability) make it harder for the 
people or organizations being overseen to evade detection.92
Private sector employers value audits for a reason.  Audits mitigate the problem, 
common to public agencies regulating private behavior, of learning how individuals are 
actually functioning in an inherently complex and unpredictable environment.  Indeed, if 
regulators avoided random auditing techniques altogether, they would face at least two 
problems.  Existing knowledge about where problems lie may prove deficient or 
outdated.  Perhaps more important, strategic actors can simply evade review by avoiding 
domains where enforcement is already occurring.  This is why the Supreme Court lauded 
random enforcement in United States v. Biswell.93  One afternoon, a pawn shop owner 
who was federally licensed to deal in sporting firearms was surprised to find a Treasury 
agent arrive to inspect the premises.  In holding that the Treasury agent could do so 
without a warrant, the majority observed that:
[I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, 
even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a 
warrant could easily frustrate inspection; and if the necessary flexibility as to 
time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a 
warrant would be negligible.94
Not surprisingly, the federal government has created several bureaucracies 
capable of using audit-type techniques to investigate what government agencies actually 
do with their discretion.  Occasionally, government agencies audit the performance of 
their own workers.95  The Government Accountability Office (originally the General 
Accounting Office, or GAO) was created early in the 20th century primarily to help 
Congress monitor the financial activities of the executive branch.96  In 1974, legislators 
gave the GAO power to review and analyze the implementation of government programs.  
Shortly thereafter, beginning in the middle of the 1970s and continuing over the next ten 
years or so, legislators began creating “Inspector General” offices in the federal 
government.97  Like the GAO, the Inspectors General have the legal power to investigate 
how federal officials use their targeted discretion.  The existence of these structures 
91 See J. David Cummins and Sharon Tennyson, Controlling Automobile Insurance Costs, 6 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 95 (1992).  For a more general discussion of the value of, and incentives for use of, audits in the 
private sector, see Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of 
the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 613 (1983).
92 See Kreps, supra note 33, at 763-64.
93
 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
94
 406 U.S. at 316.
95 See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 FED. REG. 32889 (Sept. 15, 1986)(subjecting numerous categories of 
federal employees to random drug tests); Guilty Until Proven Innocent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20. 
2006)(describing how the IRS Office of the Taxpayer Advocate audited a random sample of 500 tax returns 
where refunds had been frozen and taxpayers complained, and found that 66% of taxpayers deserved a full 
refund and another 14% deserved a partial refund).
96 See John T. Rourke, The GAO: An Evolving Role, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 453 (1978).
97 See PAUL LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY 42 (1993).
22
indicates the potentially important role that audits can play in shaping how the federal 
government uses its targeted discretion.  Whether these bureaucracies actually perform 
such audits is another matter, discussed below.98
To understand how audits of executive discretion would work, imagine a world 
much like our own, where only some decisions are subject to stringent judicial review, 
and others are subject to less stringent review.  For fairly obvious reasons, political 
principals (to use the parlance of game theory) desire to know how the government is 
using its discretion.  But constraints exist in the form of a limited budget to review 
decisions, and concerns about over-deterring the executive branch.  Earlier I noted that a 
key feature of judicial review is that courts and legislators tend to pick a standard of 
deference that’s supposed to apply to all cases in a particular class.  What audits do is to 
introduce an alternative means of review that allows for variation in both the standard of 
deference used to review cases as well as the number of cases actually reviewed.  In 
exchange for reviewing fewer cases, whoever is conducting the audits can demand more 
evidence from the executive branch, more justification, and more access to information –
all at a lower cost than what would be incurred if the same standard of deference applied 
to every decision.99
The process would unfold along the following lines.  First, an auditor would 
define some discrete set of targeted decisions to analyze (i.e., all summary exclusions at 
the border, all enemy combatant designations, all occupational safety administrative 
compliance orders, or all decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute case referrals from 
law enforcement agencies regarding mail fraud).  Second, the auditor would randomly 
choose some number or percentage of decisions to audit.  Third, those decisions would be 
reviewed far more stringently than a court would review the full potential class of 
decisions.  If a court (as with border inspection decisions) provides almost no review, the 
auditor would gather all available information about how the decision took place, what its 
effect was, what the secondary inspector knew when he denied entry, and what other 
agencies know that might be relevant to the decision.  If a court reviews IEEPA 
designations under a highly permissive version of the “arbitrary and capricious” and 
“substantial evidence” tests, the auditor would instead gather information on how an 
administrative record was complied – not just on what it purports to say.  In doing this, 
the auditor would apply some kind of standard (which I discuss below) either drawn from 
the purposes of the statutes in question, or perhaps even based on what the executive 
branch says it is trying to accomplish through its actions (for instance, in the criminal 
context, the auditor’s determination of a standard would be shaped by statements of 
prosecutors regarding the purposes that prosecutions).  Fourth, the results of the audit 
would be made available to legislators and the public, a development that could (under 
certain conditions) help pressure the agency to make modifications in its conduct.  
98 See infra Part III.
99
 The proposal is, therefore, somewhat reminiscent of one that Mashaw offered in the concluding pages of 
his exhaustive study of Social Security disability benefit determinations.  See JERRY MASHAW, 
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 226 (1983). 
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Intelligence information could be used in these determinations because it can be reviewed 
in camera.100
Admittedly, the effect of this institutional mechanism depends on whether 
legislators and the public react to the audits.  While both might sometimes ignore those 
results, the media’s reaction to GAO and Inspector General reports suggests that audits 
could prove to be salient.101  Judicial review would continue in the background at 
whatever standard of deference courts and legislatures choose.  Judges might even 
evaluate executive clamoring for deference by weighing whether a reliable audit system 
is in place, and in others courts might approach their cases differently as a result of what 
the audits revealed.  Although audits would not necessarily provide relief to every 
aggrieved person or group, they would help legislators, organized interest groups, and the 
public to learn far more about what government does than is currently known.102
ii.  Trading Off Breadth Against Depth Assuming Marginal Cost Analysis
The potential value of audits is readily apparent if one makes the heroic 
assumption that elaborate analyses of marginal costs and benefits in fact determine 
standards of stringency governing a pool of potential cases.  Assume for a moment, 
therefore, that legislators and courts have appropriately weighed the costs and benefits of 
reviewing a certain kind of decision at a particular degree of stringency.  They have 
decided, for example, that orders freezing assets should get nothing more than highly 
deferential arbitrary and capricious review.  Even if conscientious courts and legislators 
think of this degree of stringency as the best way to strike a balance among competing 
concerns, they may still recognize that there is an unfortunate by-product of this choice of 
stringency level.  Specifically, some types of errors associated with these decisions can 
only be detected if review is more stringent than at present.  When people engage in 
deliberate wrongs, for example, they tend to make efforts to hide their misconduct.  In 
effect, the function mapping stringency of review to probability of detecting mistakes or 
manipulation can be radically discontinuous, in which case it may be better to manage the 
costs of review by reviewing fewer cases more thoroughly.  It is precisely the trade-off 
social scientists make when they consider whether to allocate scarce resources to getting 
a larger sample or to investigate their cases more profoundly,103 and that courts 
themselves occasionally make when they take cautiously use samples of claims in a class, 
or health care reimbursement requests to learn more in the litigation process.104
Of course, audits introduce their own costs into the equation.  While fixing the 
precise cost of an audit system depends on institutional design issues taken up in Part II, 
100 Cf. United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1991)(using in camera review of information obtained by 
federal agents through wiretaps authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and denying 
aggrieved party’s motion for suppression); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993)(final 
chapter – discussing how fear of leaking is overblown).
101 See infra Part III.a.
102
 Depending on the assumptions made about the political system, legislators and the public might respond 
to the audits in ways that would provide relief to all or some of the people aggrieved by problematic 
applications of targeted executive discretion.  
103 See infra notes __ (emphasizing the potential value, in social research design, of using scarce resources 
to generate more information about individual cases rather than increasing sample size).
104 See infra notes __ (discussing instances of sample adjudication).
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there is good reason to expect that those costs would be lower than those associated with 
an expansion in the availability or stringency of traditional judicial review.  For one, the 
costs of audits are “scalable,” such that we can audit a smaller proportion of cases if the 
costs are perceived as being too high, then the proportion of cases that are audited could 
be reduced. If one takes the language of judicial opinions and briefs (particularly from the 
government) seriously when they discuss the appropriate stringency of review.  Beyond 
the reflexive invocation of precedent, there appears to be a consequentialist concern 
about how review at a particular degree of stringency will generate costs.  Presumably 
those costs would be less – even if we kept the potential remedy – if only one of the 
whole universe of potential cases were audited, or two or three out of a pool of hundreds 
or thousands.  If one takes the language from the judicial process seriously, a logical 
implication seems to be that reviewing all potential cases is more costly than reviewing 
some fraction of them.  Moreover, audits would not necessarily yield a direct remedy.105
To the extent that analyses of the marginal costs and benefits of review incorporate the 
possible costs to the executive branch of having a decision vacated by a court, then audits 
would also involve lower costs because they can be designed merely to reveal 
information rather than to provide direct relief.
iii.  Alternative Assumptions: Separate Informational and Cost Aspirations
While painstaking analysis of marginal costs and benefits may amount to a 
compelling prescription for deciding on stringency of review, such an analysis is almost 
certainly a far-fetched description of how courts and legislatures actually make decisions.  
Instead, as policymakers weigh the consequences of discretion, they almost certainly 
recognize that various actors -- from government actors, to directly aggrieved parties, to 
the public at large – are likely to bear different burdens, and may reap quite different 
rewards, from the review of discretionary decisions.  This complicates marginal cost 
analysis in a host of predictable ways.  In the absence of far more precise moral or 
analytical guidance than currently exists, courts and legislatures may find it nearly 
intractable to ask (for instance) how many mistaken enemy combatant designations are 
worth tolerating in exchange for a given marginal increase in security that is allegedly 
only possible if some proportion of mistaken designations is tolerated.106
Given these difficulties, one might therefore use a different metaphor to describe 
the work of principled courts and legislatures when they make decisions about the proper 
stringency of review.  One might imagine that society (through its courts and legislatures) 
makes two initially separate calculations when deciding on how to review decisions.  One 
sets an aspiration that a given review procedure (such as judicial review) not exceed a 
105
 If determined advocates of executive branch discretion choose to treat the potential loss of public trust 
arising from as the most important cost to be borne, then the very fact that audits might be effective in 
changing public perceptions about executive discretion might allegedly still make them too costly.  This 
argument may not always be entirely disingenuous, but it is a harder one to defend than one rooted in a host 
of costs involving bureaucratic attention, resources, frivolous claims, and similarly tangible costs.  In any 
case, the specificity gained in discussing costs may be at least a partial reward from contemplating audits.
106
 The argument is not that such conversion is impossible, in the sense that either the costs and benefits or 
the relevant interpersonal utilities are incommensurable.  Instead the contention is that decisionmakers, 
bombarded with briefs and policy arguments from parties with competing positions, probably find it 
simpler to set a threshold of total costs that a given review process should not exceed, and a separate 
threshold reflecting the average informational benefits sought from review of a given case.
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maximum acceptable total cost.  And another sets an aspiration regarding the minimum 
acceptable probability that a problem (whether an innocent mistake or a willful 
manipulation) will be discovered in the average reviewed case.  
A simple model helps illustrate the potential differences between audits and 
traditional judicial review in a world where society sets such separate informational and 
cost aspirations.  Begin by accepting the executive branch’s premise that more intrusive 
judicial review is a problem because it inordinately raises the cost of review associated 
with the average case, with cost here referring to the whole gamut of allegedly adverse 
consequences associated with grater review stringency.  This suggests (plausibly enough) 
that there is a relationship between the stringency of judicial review and the total cost of 
reviewing instances where executive discretion is used.  In this context, the reference to 
cost implicates several factors.  We should expect that the more cases reviewed, the 
higher is the direct cost incurred by the court (or some other reviewing authority) when 
examining cases, and by the executive branch when providing information and defending 
its actions on an individual case.  Moreover, the more cases reviewed (or at least eligible 
for review) out of a total pool of cases, the more that the benefits of targeted discretion 
might dissipate.  Decisions may be slower (either because of the resources consumed by 
the review process, or simply because the fact they will be reviewed leads the executive 
branch to make the initial determination more judiciously).  The risk of over-deterring 
may also be greater as the proportion of cases eligible for review rises towards 100%.  On 
the other hand, more stringent review is valuable because it is more likely to reveal 
problems in discretionary decisions. 
To illustrate the situation, let the terms Cd and Ci denote direct and indirect costs, 
respectively, of reviewing cases with a particular degree of stringency.  Let Pr( ) denote 
the probability that a problem is discovered in an average case given a particular degree 
of stringency in the review process, which is represented by an increasing parameter S 
that begins at zero and increases to 1, which represents maximally intrusive review.  Let 
N
c
 denote the proportion of cases reviewed in a given class of cases.  And imagine that 
the following plausible conditions hold:
• Cd and Ci increase as a linear function of S, such that C=Cd + Ci and C=f(S), such 
that one can define a two dimensional space consisting of a cost dimension C 
running vertically, and a perpendicular stringency of review dimension S running 
horizontally.
• For any given set of cases that are reviewed with a particular degree of stringency, 
both Cd and Ci increase as Nc increases.  This implies that the slope of the line 
defining the relationship between S and C becomes more elastic as the proportion 
of cases reviewed decreases.
• Pr( ) increases as a linear function of S associated with some minimum number of 
cases reviewed, such that one can also define a two dimensional space consisting 
of a probability of discovering problems dimension Pr( ), and a precisely 
orthogonal stringency of review dimension S.
• At some levels of stringency, the probability of discovering problems falls below 
the social aspiration for an acceptable minimum (where “acceptable minimum” 
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means the point below which, according to a social consensus, the probability of 
discovering problems should not fall).  There is a unique point on the S dimension 
(call it Smin), indicating the minimum acceptable degree of stringency.
• For any given N
c
, there is some point C
max
 representing the social aspiration for the 
maximum cost of review that society is willing to bear for a given method of 
reviewing executive discretion.  Because C increases as a function S, C
max
corresponds to a maximum degree of stringency of review (call this S
max
).
Figure 1:  Discretion and Traditional Judicial Review (Total Review Cost Versus 
Stringency in the Average Case Reviewed)
Stringency (S)
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Cost-stringency line
Prob.-stringency line
Feasible reviewset
Max. prob. of discovering
problems
Figure 1 shows how these factors can interact in situations where separate goals 
have been set for managing the total cost of review and the probability of discovering 
problems in the average reviewed case, and judicial review is nonetheless likely to work 
reasonably well.  Any point on the horizontal stringency axis (at the top and bottom of 
the figure) would have corresponding points, indicating the total cost of that degree of 
stringency and its associated probability of discovering problems in the average case, on 
the two perpendicular axes.  The upper part of the figure shows the relationship between 
the total costs of review and stringency for cases reviewed.  The cost-stringency line has 
roughly the same slope as the probability-stringency line in the lower figure, which 
indicates the relationship between stringency and the probability of discovering problems 
A. 
Stringency 
and total 
review cost
B. Stringency 
and 
informational 
benefit in the 
average 
reviewed case
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in an average case.107  The space between the lowest acceptable bound of review (S
min) 
and the highest permissible cost (which corresponds to S
max
) is what might be called the 
“feasible review set.”  This is the space where courts (or legislators) have some flexibility 
in setting the stringency of the doctrine.  Any level of stringency lower than S
min means 
there will not be a high enough probability of discovering problems, and a level higher 
than S
max
 effectively breaks the bank – either because the review process itself becomes 
too expensive or because of there is too much interference with the benefits of discretion 
in the executive branch.108
Figure 2: How Greater Stringency Can Be Achieved in the Average Audited 
Case (Total Review Cost Versus Stringency in the Average Case Reviewed)
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Switch now from thinking about judicial review to thinking about audits, and a 
subtle but important difference emerges in the situation.  Because we have assumed that 
the relationship between C and S becomes more elastic for an average case as the 
proportion of cases reviewed decreases, then audits allow a higher degree of stringency 
of review (and thereby a lower standard of deference) for the same cost.  Figure 2 shows 
107
 Thus, in this first figure C=S=Pr( ).
108
 I’m assuming here that Smin and Smax are set exogenously, but a more complex model might derive 
these endogenously as responses to what is learned over time.  For present purposes, we might assume that 
Smax reflects some welfarist conception of a budget constraint as well as a technical judgment of how 
much executive branch discretion is desirable for a particular set of decisions.  Meanwhile, Smin might 
reflect the minimal degree of stringency necessary to force the executive branch (or one of its 
organizational units) to behave appropriately.
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how this looks.  In contrast with Figure 1, the slope of the cost-stringency line is now 
flatter than that of the probability-stringency line in the lower portion of the figure.109
Now the feasible review set suddenly expands dramatically while the costs of review 
remain the same.  The implication is that, in exchange for lower costs by reviewing a 
smaller proportion of cases, the auditor gains the chance to review cases more thoroughly 
– to ask for more evidence, to require a more explicit showing of facts in a record, to 
inquire into how a particular record was developed, and ultimately, to better understand 
what the pressures may have affected the decisionmaker and distorted her decision.  What 
both Figures 1 and 2 have in common, nonetheless, is that the decisionmaker (whether a 
reviewing court or an auditor) can choose a level of stringency above S
min – that is, above 
the level of stringency associated with the minimum socially-acceptable probability of 
discovering problems.  Although this is being achieved for only a proportion of cases (in 
Figure 2), the information produced about that subset of cases is vastly more valuable 
(assuming the particular conditions) than what is learned from the essentially rubber-
stamp review of every decision.110
The preceding discussion highlights two major differences between audits and 
traditional forms of judicial review.  The costs of audits can be adjusted by changing the 
number of cases reviewed, not just the stringency of that review.  In addition, audits 
would not reflect the distortions imposed by the litigation process.  The cases reviewed 
would not be a function of who can obtain representation or what particular fact pattern 
entices judicial attention.  As explained below, both of these characteristics turn out to be 
important in making the case for supplementing judicial review with audits of executive 
discretion.
D. Why  Traditional Judicial Review Suffers From Limitations
So far the argument has proceeded by showing how audits can substitute some of 
the functions associated with judicial review.  The properties associated with audit 
review, moreover, can avoid certain distortions common to the judicial process.  But the 
value of such properties cannot be appreciated in the abstract.  To better understand such 
review’s merits as a way of overseeing executive discretion, we must review some of the 
costs and benefits of deviating from the conventional limited-discretion baseline 
discussed above.  This entails a careful accounting of the alleged value of robust 
executive power in the absence of judicial scrutiny, along with an evaluation of the 
process that may undermine desirable bureaucratic behavior when the executive branch 
has been entrusted with such additional discretion.  Such analyses make it easier to 
appreciate the strength of the case for auditing executive discretion, and the concomitant 
problems associated with a world devoid of audits.
i.  Reviewing Rationales for Departing From a Limited-Discretion Baseline.
Given the allegedly intimate link between accountability and court review, 
departures from a baseline of stringent review presumably should be contingent on a 
satisfactory accounting of the benefits from such a move.  So what are the benefits?  A 
fairly obvious one is speed, or what is commonly termed “efficiency.”  Some decisions 
109
 In contrast with the previous figure, the relationship is now roughly C=3/2 S = 3/2 Pr( ).
110 See infra notes __ for a more detailed explanation of this point.
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need to be made quickly if they’re going to matter.  Suppose policymakers confront a 
possible outbreak of avian flu virus.  They may consider imposing a quarantine.  They 
must decide quickly whether American airports will receive flights from the affected 
country.  To delay the decision effectively becomes a decision to let the planes land.  
Even if it is possible to wait, it may cost a lot to do so.  The Treasury can wait to freeze a 
suspicious charity’s assets, but those assets may soon leave the group’s coffers for some 
tropical island bank secrecy haven.  Letting executive authorities have discretion lets 
them not only decide quickly – and the saved time can translate into money, extra safety, 
and convenience.  The point is not lost on courts reviewing many of the federal 
government’s national security decisions.111  Nor is it lost on courts and scholars writing 
about other aspects of public law – such as those concerned about the “ossification” of 
regulatory rules.112  On a related note, less review also saves two kinds of resources: 
those the court or other reviewing authority would expend on analyzing a case, and those 
that the government would spend defending itself.  These costs are likely to be especially 
salient because courts, relying on some version of stare decisis or horizontal equity 
norms, assume they are fashioning a standard that will apply to all (or nearly all) similar 
cases.113
The argument for discretion in such cases often exalts the centrality of 
expertise.114  The conventional wisdom is that agencies and the executive branch have 
greater specialized technical competence than the judges who might review their 
decisions.  Given its perceived intellectual pedigree, this justification recurs in judicial 
decisions in a wide range of domains, regardless of whether the subject is medical 
evaluation of disability claims, military planning, or evaluation of chemical data.115  No 
doubt that expertise is valuable.  The more some reviewing authority intervenes, the 
greater the risk that expert decisions will be undone.  More intervention may even dilute 
the incentives of decisionmakers to develop and use expertise, or innovate in desirable 
ways that may not immediately inspire public confidence.116  Discretion may also have a 
role in helping government harmonize competing goals, trading off some desired goals 
against further delays (for example) in achieving policy objectives considered less 
compelling.117
In the same vein, supporters of executive discretion accept bold suppositions 
about executive branch accountability to bolster their case.  Accountability is surely a 
contestable and often ambiguous concept.  But scholarly references to it appear to 
encompass, at a minimum, the idea that the public should be able to assign responsibility 
for government decisions and to force decisionmakers to bear a cost when those decisions 
are not acceptable.  In an ironic twist, the rhetoric of accountability that so often bolsters 
arguments for stringent judicial review sometimes serves precisely the opposite goal.  
111 See Water Keeper Alliance v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 271 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001).
112 See Cornelius Kerwin, Rulemaking (3d ed. 1999).  See also McGarity, supra note 22, at 21-23.
113 See supra note 28.
114 See Perez v. F.B.I., 71 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1995).  But see North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 
F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002).
115 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 439 U.S. 961 (1978); I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
116 Cf. KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991).
117 See Greenbaum v. E.P.A., 370 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2004).
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The argument proceeds along the following lines.  The less that court (or other external) 
intervention encroaches on the executive’s domain, the more that legislators, organized 
interest groups and the larger public can focus on rewarding or punishing the executive 
(or the inferior officer) for her decisions.118  This position implies not only a reluctance to 
see courts throw sand in the gears of some hypothetical scheme for accountability, but a 
confidence that an accounting will indeed be rendered to either superior officers or the 
public.  Thus courts observe (as did this one in declining to engage in review of 
prosecutorial discretion) that “while this discretion is subject to abuse or misuse just as is 
judicial discretion, deviations from [the prosecutor’s] duty as an agent of the Executive 
are to be dealt with by his superiors.”119
ii.  Why Bureaucracies Granted Discretion Fail (to Learn).
The arguments extolling discretion each have a grain of truth.  What they do not 
address is how much – and how easily – discretion can be abused, whether the context is 
social security benefit payments, border screening, enemy combatant designations, or 
prosecutorial enforcement.  Consider, for example, what could be called the “learning 
costs” problem.  Executive branch bureaucracies and the people who work in them spend 
their days (ostensibly) carrying out legal mandates.  People who work there do that in 
part by relying on expertise.  They hone that expertise by learning from their 
environment, and correcting their mistakes.  But if no external authority monitors the 
bureaucracy, then those who work there may be unwilling or unable to learn much of 
anything.  In fact, several scholars have suggested that external court review helps 
bureaucratic institutions learn.  But that belief is not always fully explained, and court 
review carries concomitant risks of over-deterring executive branch activity.  No doubt 
sometimes an inspector’s good conscience or an agency’s strong internal culture 
contribute to reasonable decisions about what assets to freeze or who should be labeled 
an enemy combatant.  Nonetheless, it is certainly plausible to assume that such desirable 
circumstances do not always arise, and that judicial review helps create conditions that 
foster learning.  
Four separate but interrelated reasons support this claim.  First, a substantial body 
of research suggests that people learn when they have reason to do so.120  Other things 
being equal, the dilution of review may deprive individuals in public bureaucracies of 
reasons to learn (at least, limits on review may disrupt public officials’ incentives to learn 
with the same intensity than they would if review were more stringent).  This assumes, 
quite plausibly, that a review process turning up mistakes can be embarrassing to people, 
or that people in the agency may otherwise suffer some costs if they face some kind of 
review process that does not go well.121  Second, organizations develop routines that 
blind them.  As Diane Vaughan wrote in her study of the Challenger launch decision:
118 See, e.g., Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)(“While agencies are not directly accountable to 
the people, the Chief Executive is…”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 
(1983)(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119
 Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
120 See ARTHUR LUPIA AND MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN 
WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (2001).
121
 This is certainly true in the case of people who work in offices whose broad performance is review by 
Inspectors General or the GAO.  See infra notes 128 and 129.
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Possibly the most significant lesson from the Challenger case is how 
environmental and organizational contingencies create prerational forces that 
shape worldview, normalizing signals of potential danger, resulting in mistakes 
with harmful human consequences.  The explanation of the Challenger launch is a 
story of how people who worked together developed patterns that blinded them to 
the consequences of their actions.  It is not only about the development of norms 
but about the incremental expansion of normative boundaries: how small changes 
– new behaviors that were slight deviations from the normal course of events –
gradually became the norm, providing a basis for accepting additional deviance.  
No rules were violated; there was no intent to do harm.  Yet harm was done.122
[Emphasis added].
External review may elucidate things that people inside the organization fail to 
appreciate.  Outsiders may see things not despite, but precisely because of, the absence of 
expertise.  Which means that even if discretion plays a vital role in creating the incentives 
for people to gather expertise and for other reasons discussed previously, its abundance 
may diminish opportunities for learning from mistaken enemy combatant designations, 
border inspection decisions, asset freezing determinations, and health or safety 
inspections.  The most attractive kinds of organizational learning – where the 
organization learns to achieve important goals better and more efficiently – is likely to be 
rarely encountered, if in fact it is encountered at all.123  Watering down or forgoing 
judicial review altogether leaves the problem of how agencies will learn from their 
mistakes, and indeed, how agencies will even realize that they have made a mistake.124
Large grants of discretion can have at least two other problematic consequences.  
In some cases, executive branch officials may succumb to the temptation to use their 
discretion to create an appealing impression among the public.  I discuss this problem at 
greater length elsewhere,125 but the basic insight is a simple one. Executive authorities 
face fewer checks in the domain of discretionary action than in traditional regulatory or 
criminal justice realms.  Accordingly, discretionary actions can serve as a sort of signal 
that the public (or political superiors) can use in forming judgments about the 
competence of the executive branch (or an organization within it).  As long as the 
public’s impressions of the executive branch’s expertise, success, ability, and resolve are 
influenced in part by discretionary actions, then those actions will become tempting 
122 DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND 
DEVIANCE AT NASA 409-410 (1996)
123 See Michal Tamuz, Learning Disabilities for Regulators: The Perils of Organizational Learning in the 
Air Transportation Industry, 33 ADMIN. & SOC. 276 (2001); March et al., supra note 31, at 2-3.
124 See Mashaw and Harfst, supra note __, for a discussion of how a regulatory agency (in that case, 
NHTSA) learned to use alternative policymaking strategies to avoid the costs associated with judicial 
review.  The example serves to emphasize two points, both of which are relevant to the present discussion: 
(a) that agencies appear to react to judicial review, and (b) that organizational learning is not necessarily 
associated with learning too achieve the most valuable organizational goals better.  Learning can be a bad 
thing; no doubt that organizations making large numbers of discretionary decisions that rarely if ever get 
reviewed (or, if reviewed, rarely get scrutinized carefully) probably learn that they can shift resources, time, 
attention, quality control, and strict adherence to legal or aspirational goals away from those decisions and 
towards other pursuits.  The question is how to encourage the most desirable kinds of learning.
125 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Mismatch Between State Power and State Capacity in 
Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 15 (2004).
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levers to create favorable public perceptions.  Frozen assets and specially-designated 
terrorist organizations send the message that the executive branch knows what it’s doing.  
It may not.  This state of affairs may skew citizens’ ability to evaluate the effectiveness of 
their own government.  And the discretionary actions may themselves have costs, 
including the creation of perverse incentives for regulated groups,126 diminished 
compliance with treaties, or simply the individual mistreatment suffered by individual 
detainees (for example) whose weeks as enemy combatants became months and then 
years before ending (at least for some) in freedom.  There is, finally, the specter of more 
deliberate transgressions.  Just as discretion allows political authorities to engage in 
subtle, politically-motivated self-dealing, it can also lead to some employees engaging in 
blatant, willful malfeasance.127
When stalwart defenders of executive discretion come close to acknowledging 
these realities, their most frequent move is to invoke a political process that is rarely 
expressly defined.  They are obviously right to recognize how public organizations exist 
in a larger political context.  But assuming that such a context will reliably and 
consistently counterbalance the tendencies I’ve just described requires accepting heroic 
assumptions.  Even if voters often behaved relatively rationally as the term is 
conventionally understood in modern political science, the results of the political game 
are endogenous to the information available.  Agency relationships change in response to 
what the players come to know, even if – to paraphrase Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld – voters know what they do not know.128
A more plausible assumption can be grounded in the extensive behavioral 
research tradition in mid-to-late 20th century political science, suggesting that voters often 
do not know what they do not know.129  One might even question the electorate’s 
distribution of its scarce cognitive attention, as there is no particularly good reason to 
think that voters come to focus on the facets of law or policy that they should even if we 
use their own consistently expressed and stable values as a benchmark.130  These 
limitations constrain the electorate’s capacity to provide a bulwark against bureaucratic 
failure.  And they explain, among other things, why legislators themselves often do just 
fine not only if they ignore festering problems of bureaucratic competence,131 but if they 
126 See id.
127 See THE ABU GHARIB INVESTIGATIONS: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL AND 
PENTAGON ON THE SHOCKING PRISONER ABUSE IN IRAQ (2005).
128 See Hart Seely, The Poetry of D.H. Rumsfeld, SLATE (April 2, 2003), avail at. http://www.slate.com/id
/2081042/ (last accessed December 13, 2005).
129 See, e.g., ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN 
WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998)(emphasizing citizens’ limited knowledge about politics); Richard R. 
Lau and David P. Redlawsk, Voting Correctly, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 585 (1997) (using survey data to 
construct a statistical model estimating the proportion of voters that vote “correctly” given their attitudes 
and impressions, and finding that one in four voters voted incorrectly in the five American presidential 
elections between 1972 and 1988).
130 Cf. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411 (2005).
131 See Kenneth E. Scott and Barry R. Weingast, Banking Reform: Economic Propellants, Political 
Impediments, in REFORMING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES 19-36 
(George G. Kaufman, ed., 1994).
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deliberately create them.132  The point is not that electoral checks are irrelevant.  It’s that 
they’re not entirely reliable, and they are often dependent on some mechanism – like 
judicial review – to focus public attention and produce information for it.
E.  How Audits Can Ameliorate the Limitations of Traditional Judicial Review.
The preceding discussion implies that bureaucracies should frequently be 
expected to face pressures to render poor decisions, unless they are subjected to 
constraints that judge them in promising directions.  Those constraints depend, in turn, on 
the public availability of information about bureaucratic performance.  Once the 
executive discretion problem is thus recast, it becomes plain how audits can often 
generate such valuable information.  If the costs of review only apply to a small fraction 
of cases, then marginal cost analysis permits more stringent review of that random subset 
of cases.  Willful malfeasance will be harder to conceal, and (more generally) mistakes 
that would simply not appear under deferential judicial review may emerge, regardless of 
whether they involve compliance orders, passenger prescreening procedures, or other 
forms of administrative action.133
But an even more striking rationale for audits emerges if we imagine that courts 
and legislators are not precisely balancing marginal costs and benefits when deciding 
how to review executive discretion.  Return instead to the possibility that legislators and 
courts are instead trying to negotiate the difficult terrain created by inconsistent social 
aspirations.  What happens if a reasonable amount of review is simultaneously 
prohibitively expensive and extremely valuable?  Lawyers may seem to be talking past 
each other in such a scenario, and judicial review itself may be condemned to fail because 
the costs of review make the socially desired degree of stringency for reviewed cases 
appear too expensive.  Such costs may arise from the resource burdens directly associated 
with the provision of review, from increases in the probability of interference with 
desirable executive branch activity, or from the resources necessary for the executive to 
respond to judicial proceedings.  Figure 3 indicates the problem. It depicts a situation 
where the curve depicting the relationship of stringency of review to costs of review (i.e., 
the cost-stringency function) actually looks quite different from the curve depicting the 
relationship between stringency of review and the probability of uncovering mistakes 
(i.e., probability-stringency function).  
Suppose, for example, that the first function is a linear one, just as in Figures 1 
and 2.  Stringency pushes up the cost of review in a constant fashion.  More stringent 
review means more time spent adjudicating disputes about executive discretion, more 
executive branch resources spent resolving those disputes, and a greater probability that 
132 See Barry R. Weingast, Caught in the Middle: The President, Congress, and the Political-Bureaucratic 
System, in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 312 (Joel D. Aberbach and Mark A. Peterson, eds. 2005).
133
 This assumes, plausibly, that for most domains the gains from greater stringency in review of the limited 
sample of cases outweighs cursory review of all cases in a particular class (which is already available, in 
most cases, with existing deferential forms of judicial review).  Even if judicial review is entirely 
precluded, stringent review of a small sample may prove vastly more informative than dividing a scarce 
review budget among an entire pool of potential cases.  For instance, a non-linear function mapping 
stringency to a given probability of discovering problems may doom deferential review to uncover nothing; 
meanwhile, a small percentage sample of a larger population may reveal almost as much as review of the 
entire population.  See infra Part II.b for an elaborate of the last point.
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review will render decisions about freezing assets or administrative compliance orders 
unworkable.  But (as the lower portions of Figure 3 indicate) imagine that the relationship 
between stringency of review and the probability of discovering problems is starkly 
discontinuous.  That is – a substantial increase in the stringency of review yields a very 
small appreciable benefit in terms of Pr ( ), even though the cost is still increasing in a 
linear fashion as the stringency does.  Then suddenly there is a substantial increase.  This 
sort of relationship might describe situations where most of the problems affecting 
targeted discretionary decisions involve complicated willful malfeasance (such as TSA 
officials trying to cover up problems with how they put names on a “no-fly” list).  It 
might also describe instances where bureaucratic requirements appear to have been 
followed on paper, but where, in fact, those requirements are not actually followed.134  In 
such cases, it is likely that problems could only be detected with a decidedly more 
exacting brand of review.
Now imagine juxtaposing this situation with a social aspiration for a relatively 
low total cost (S
max
), which is what the court may set if the decision has to do with 
national security.  And notice what this does to the feasible review set.  It disappears, 
leaving the reviewing court with no way to simultaneously achieve social aspirations 
regarding the maximum total cost of review and the minimum acceptable probability of 
discovering problems for a reviewed case.  This implies that at least in some instances 
where targeted discretion is used, there may be no feasible review set, because the cost of 
reviewing discretionary decisions at the level of stringency necessary to actually have a 
credible chance of detecting problems far exceeds the maximum socially-acceptable cost 
of review.  
Things look a different if we use audits instead of traditional judicial review.  The 
right side of Figure 3 tells the story.  As with Figure 2, the slope of the cost-stringency 
line is flatter (more elastic), which leads to a higher stringency of review for any given 
cost that is paid for review.  The number of decisions reviewed is also smaller.  But in 
many domains, it seems plausible that greater stringency for a smaller number of 
decisions would tend to be associated with a higher comparative probability of detecting 
problems than lower stringency for a larger number of decisions.  Such a trade-off might 
be especially worth making, for example, when the total number of decisions rendered is 
relatively smaller than in other domains (thereby making a small number of audited 
decisions into a larger proportion of the total decisions), or when the soundness of a 
decision depends not on what an administrative record says but on how the record was 
gathered.  In situations where the stringency increase possible from reviewing fewer 
cases yields such a greater probability of uncovering problems, the result of using audits 
creates the possibility of a small feasible review set where there was none before –
134
 After the September 11 attacks, for example, federal law enforcement authorities detained hundreds of 
aliens in the United States and established a procedure to prevent a detainee’s release until the FBI 
determined that a given individual was “cleared” of involvement.  Despite the authorities’ initial 
protestation that individuals were released promptly after receiving FBI clearance, it actually took between 
5 and 119 for individuals to be released.  The 119 day hold was the result of an “administrative error.”  See
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A 
REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 129 n.109 (April 2003), avail. at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/detainees.pdf (last accessed, November 1, 2005).
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enough room for the auditor to avoid exceeding the maximum cost yet to still have a 
reasonable opportunity to detect problems afflicting discretionary decisions.  
Figure 3:  Instances Where Judicial Review “Fails” in the Average Case 
(Where Society Generates Separate Informational and Cost Aspirations)
C
S
S
Pr(¹ ) Pr(¹ )
C
S
S
Judicial Review
(No feasible review set!)
Audits
(Cost grows more
slowly as stringency
grows)
The value of that error detection mechanism would also lie in the more 
representative picture of bureaucratic behavior it might yield.  By its nature, litigation 
produces a biased sample.  The cases we learn about are the ones that get litigated, and 
under various plausible conditions those cases are not the only ones likely to involve 
valid claims.135  As Bill Simon has pointed out in the welfare context, for example, this 
pattern can gradually distort public perceptions of a policy’s strengths and weaknesses by 
focusing attention on only one aspect of an administrative system’s problems (e.g., 
underpayments, rather than overpayments).136  In contrast, audits have the potential to 
generate information regardless of the willingness or opportunity of individuals to 
challenge specific decisions.  
135
 There may be both overbreadth and underinclusiveness problems.  For an early discussion of selection 
effects, see George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984).  For an illuminating discussion of how different institutional rules can shape selection 
effects, see Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 
REV. LITIG. 47 (2004).
136 See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L.  REV. 1431 (1986).
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While the preceding features are likely to render audits quite valuable, two 
caveats are in order at this point.  First, the argument thus far tenders audits as a 
conceptual alternative to judicial review, not as a wholesale replacement of it.  Its 
principal contention is that we should consider the implications of policing discretion 
through audits instead of through judicial review, which I’ve characterized as a form of 
supervision premised on applying the same degree of stringency to every case in a given 
class.  This does not imply that audits should generally replace traditional judicial review 
as an exclusive means of overseeing executive discretion.  Judicial review obviously 
serves a host of important functions, of which producing information about the 
performance and reasonableness of public bureaucracies making discretionary decisions 
is only one. Litigation harnesses the intricate machinery of adjudicatory bureaucracy to 
articulate and clarify legal norms in the context of specific cases.  It can vindicate the 
interests of people who are legally and morally entitled to a proverbial “day,” in court, or 
to a set of special remedies for which litigation is the best rationing device.137
Second, the belief that audits can deliver the aforementioned benefits depends on 
making certain assumptions about the powers of the auditor, though none are particularly
implausible.  Specifically, the auditor needs to be in a better position to discover 
problems in the use of targeted discretion than the bureaucracy being reviewed.  In this 
context, the reference to “better position” implies at least three qualities:  (a) that the 
auditor is motivated to discover problems (and not to exaggerate them), thereby avoiding 
some of the willful malfeasance and politically-oriented self-dealing problems that 
bureaucracies have because of their political context; (b) that the auditor has sufficient 
abilities to evaluate the discretionary decision, perhaps in part through reference to some 
explicit or implicit standard of what is expected from such decisions; and (c) that the 
auditor is at least somewhat better than the decisionmakers being reviewed at avoiding 
some of the more subtle mistakes that afflict discretionary decisionmaking.  Tempting as 
it may be to collapse these conditions into an “expertise” parameter, it’s important to 
recognize that expertise (in addition to being a far more ambiguous term than is often 
recognized) is a dangerously seductive yet potentially quite dangerous two-edged sword: 
what makes some bureaucratic decisionmakers blind to the complexities of the problems 
they face is precisely their expertise in defining those problems in a standard, predictable 
fashion that often turns out to be wrong.138  Nonetheless, the auditor(s) must know 
137
 There may be some instances where actual or perceived resource constraints force a choice between 
policing discretion through audits or doing so through some expanded version of judicial review (i.e., 
supplementing narrow review of constitutional questions with broader arbitrariness review).  In those 
exceptional circumstances, the framework I have provided suggests that sometimes – such as when it’s 
likely that officials have made an effort to conceal willful malfeasance – allocating scarce resources to 
audits would be preferable to allocating them to traditional judicial review.  Nonetheless, my primary goal 
is therefore to argue that supplementing such review with audits would make possible the production of 
socially valuable information.  Such information simply would not be available where reviewing authorities 
are constrained to review every case in a particular class with the same degree of stringency.  Once that 
information is available, judges could be among the consumers of it by adjusting their evaluations of the 
appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny that a given class of decisions warrants.
138 See, e.g., Vaughan, supra note 64, at 62 (“[T]he consequence of professional training and experience is 
itself a particularlistic world-view comprising certain assumptions, expectations, and experiences that 
become integrated with the person’s sense of the world.”).  See also CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL 
ACCIDENTS (1984); SCOTT D. SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY (1995).
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something about what constitutes accuracy when allegedly terrorist assets are frozen or 
when agencies use administrative compliance orders.139  Whether it is possible to 
generate this and other conditions depends in large measure on how to resolve questions 
about the details of the institutional design addressed below.
II.
WHY THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PROBLEMS INHERENT IN AUDITS ARE MANAGEABLE
A.  Audits Can Be Adapted to Address Multiple Forms of Discretion
As Kenneth C. Davis recognized a generation ago, government authorities are 
flush with power to make highly informal decisions affecting people, where “the usual 
quality of justice” may be quite low.140  Such discretion, showcased in the preceding 
discussion, may often involve specific, targeted decisions whose primary effect is on 
specific individuals and groups.141  This type of discretionary power government officials 
possess to freeze allegedly terrorist assets, place someone on a government-run “no-fly” 
list, or levy certain environmental or occupational safety fines could be called “targeted 
discretion.”  Similar decisions involve bureaucracies applying some implicit or explicit 
legal standard, often in combination with some sort of policy basis (i.e., “enemy 
combatants are dangerous terrorists, many of them linked to Al-Qaeda”) that the 
executive branch itself has articulated as a rationale for these decisions.142 Because of 
their frequency and their impact on discrete individuals and groups, targeted discretionary 
decisions are most immediately suitable for audits.
Targeted executive discretion stands in contrast to broader policy judgments.  
Those judgments involve questions of how to interpret a statute or the relevant policy 
considerations when developing a legal standard, such as a regulatory rule or the content 
of an executive order. Obviously, some policy judgments are designed precisely to be 
carried out through the exercise of targeted discretionary decisions.  The Social Security 
Administration promulgates standards governing benefit payments, thereby making a 
policy judgment about how to use its targeted discretion.  When government freezes 
allegedly terrorist assets, the State and Treasury Departments implement statutory 
standards from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), as 
interpreted through policy judgments in the president’s executive orders.  But despite 
139
 And obviously, whatever the benefits of specialization (which help establish the presence of condition 
“b” above), they need to be balanced against the risk of sacrificing condition “c.”
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 Davis, supra note 1, at 216.
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 Targeted discretion bears some resemblance to the concept of “informal adjudication” long discussed by 
administrative law scholars.  For a brief discussion of the definitions associated with “informal 
adjudication” and some of the doctrinal problems implicit in this category of administrative action, see
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail That Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex Ante Constraints on 
Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1057 (2004). Obtaining review of such decisions under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard, or on the basis of some constitutional theory, is unlikely to provide 
adequate oversight for these decisions because of the specter of the review costs problem. But one should 
nonetheless beware the term informal adjudication as a description of the full scope of discretionary 
decisions that merit new review mechanisms.  Many discretionary decisions are neither informal in the 
sense that they are bereft of some alleged procedural safeguards (for example, review of administrative 
compliance orders), and in the case of many others, the term adjudication is but a euphemistic concession 
to an almost entirely unrealized aspiration.
142 See Brief for Respondent, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 7, at 12. 
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their overlapping contours, these different sorts of discretion should nonetheless be 
distinguished.  Though others may disagree, it seems as though policy judgments call for 
a different kind of review compared to targeted discretionary decisions that so often 
involve applying rules or standards to a particular set of facts.  Whatever the arguments 
for deferring to the executive branch when an agency writes a rule or a president signs an 
executive order, those arguments seem at least somewhat weaker when the executive 
branch claims to be applying a given standard to the facts.  In the latter case the implicit 
claim is: “we may have to apply some judgment, but when we detain someone as an 
enemy combatant, freeze assets, or inspect an industrial plant, there’s no question about 
the purpose we are serving.  We’re enforcing the law.”  
No doubt sometimes government officials will argue that the details of a policy 
judgment – like precisely what behaviors make a charity liable to have its assets frozen –
should not be made entirely public.143  They might also argue that, in some domains such 
as presidential decisions involving executive agreements, standards reflecting policy 
judgments should develop organically in response to experience instead of being fixed 
ahead of time, or that any review system at all would wreak havoc.144  Even if one finds 
these positions attractive on the surface, it seems easier to think about them if we accept 
at least some distinction between the following classes of decisions: decisions that 
explicitly disavow consistency with any standard, decisions that fix a standard that is 
supposed to apply across cases, and decisions that apply standards (or even quite general 
values) to specific cases.  To the extent that executive authorities claim to be applying a 
standard, then arguments against review become exceedingly difficult to accept. Though 
some may even insist that certain discretionary decisions involving national security (for 
example) are entirely immune from any standard,145 in most cases such a claim seems 
hard to reconcile with a simple but persistent imperative: that government decisions 
should not be arbitrary.  Indeed, audits of executive discretion may prove viable even 
when the decisions in question superficially appear less amenable to sampling.  It may be 
possible to modify audits to shed light on applications of discretion drawn from a sparse 
set of decisions, or on policy discretion exercised in the course of rulemaking, by 
aggregating cases from different domains into a larger population from which to 
sample.146
143 See Doherty v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 775 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1985). For a skeptical view of such 
contentions, see Vaughan, supra note__.
144 Cf. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170.
145
 The contention may be that, in addition to being free of any sort of formal review, certain national 
security decisions – like a presidential choice to bomb a potentially threatening target in the Sudan – should
not conform to any standard at all.  This position seems to confound the question of whether we should 
avoid setting a standard because it’s too difficult to monitor it, or whether in an ideal world the president 
should never rely on a standard at all.  The former is easier to justify than the latter.
146
 Small samples are not a fatal problem when Bayesian techniques are applied and the analysis is 
accompanied by appropriate assumptions.  See, e.g., M. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, Organizational Aspects of 
Engineering System Safety: The Case of Offshore Platforms, 250 SCIENCE 1210 (1990).  Regarding policy 
discretion: although policy discretion arguably raises different problems, it may also be worth scrutinizing, 
case-by-case, the basis for application of an overtly stated policy; for example, how specific permissible 
exposure limits get set when courts allow rules that fix multiple standards – which they now discourage, 
though audits might be a promising alternative to simply banning such rules; instances of information 
dissemination and use regulatory agencies (as an alternative to the potentially cumbersome data quality act 
rules).
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B. Most Institutional Design Problems Have Plausible Solutions
While a framework for conducting audits is adaptable almost by definition, 
practical questions of institutional design lurk just beneath the surface. The most 
immediate such question concerns what discretionary decisions should be prioritized for 
auditing in a world of scarce resources.  It is plainly obtuse to seek audits of the most 
trivial discretionary actions and informal adjudications.147  Even if this were not so, scarce 
resources should compel auditors to set rough priorities.  In doing so, auditors should 
probably draw on at least four factors reflecting defensible intuitions about the underlying 
goals of the audit system: (1) the extent (or absence) of alternative review mechanisms, 
or factors favoring interest group or legislative reactions likely to reduce the probability 
of bureaucratic failure, (2) the costs of discretionary decisions (particularly erroneous 
ones) to individuals or groups aggrieved, (3) the existence of a standard against which 
decisions could be assessed, or the relative feasibility of constructing such a standard 
from sources such as public executive branch declarations about the particular objectives 
of discretionary action in a given context (more on this below); and (4) the potential 
availability of information that an auditing authority could use to evaluate decisions.  
Such a framework avoids placing traffic stops at national parks at the same level of 
priority as enemy combatant designations or social security claims.  It also avoids facile 
reliance on pre-existing, and potentially problematic, notions of where the greatest 
problems lie in the exercise of executive discretion.
Regardless of what discretionary decisions are audited, the question of how large 
a sample to use depends, as a prescriptive matter, on the costs and benefits of larger (as 
opposed to smaller) samples.  As a practical matter, the auditor’s approach to sampling 
might also be informed by political circumstances that translate into resource constraints 
(akin to the aforementioned “maximum acceptable cost” of review), and by prior beliefs 
about the desired deterrent effect on decisionmakers.  Ordinary statistical theory offers a 
straightforward framework to calculate the appropriate sample given certain desired 
parameters reflecting the decisionmaker’s desired level of confidence in the results.148
Although this formulaic analytical approach does not capture all the nuances with which 
an auditor must contend, it does reveal some important considerations.  For one, there is 
no textbook answer to the question of how large a sample should be.  Decisionmakers do 
not (and ought not to) choose desired levels of confidence in a vacuum.  As is true of 
courts and legislators structuring the analogous judicial domain, decisionmakers have 
reason to consider the costs as well as the benefits – which means that smaller samples 
may sometimes be appropriate even if larger ones are more representative.  Since 
resource constraints can force a trade off between stringency of review (for any given 
case in the sample) and breadth of review, then decisions about sample size should 
depend, in large measure, on prior guesses about the slope and shape of the curve 
depicting the impact of stringency on the probability of discovering problems in 
decisions.  
147 Cf. Krotoszynski, supra note__, at 1069 (“Taken to its logical extreme, a decision to turn on the lights or
lower an agency's office building temperature two degrees constitutes ‘informal adjudication.’”).
148 See JUN SHAO, HANSHENG WANG, AND SHEIN-CHUNG CHOW, SAMPLE SIZE CALCULATION IN CLINICAL 
RESEARCH 28- 29 (2003).
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Those choices regarding sample size should also reflect the fact that sample size 
has diminishing marginal returns.  Counter-intuitively, as the size of the total population 
of decisions increases beyond a certain point, then the proportion of that population that 
must be reviewed to gain a reasonably accurate picture of the whole population actually 
declines.  Sample sizes of between five hundred and a thousand observations may 
provide a revealing statistical snapshot even when drawn from exceedingly large 
populations.149  This suggests that auditing only a tiny fraction of a large population and 
reviewing the sample carefully might yield valuable new information.  Smaller 
populations (for example, all the cases of the 500 or so individuals currently held in 
Guantanamo) pose more of a challenge, since even a sample that constitutes a higher total 
percentage of the population can prove less useful in making statistical inferences if the 
sample is numerically small in absolute terms.150
Now juxtapose the insights of statistical and organization theory, and several 
implications emerge.  If the total population of cases is large enough to allow the auditor 
to choose between 500 and 1000 cases without exceeding the maximum acceptable cost, 
then the resulting analysis will likely exhibit desirable properties of reliability even if the 
sample is a tiny proportion of the total population of cases (for example, the total number 
of indictments issued over several years, or the total number of disability 
determinations).151  If the cost of obtaining a sample of that size is allegedly prohibitive, 
or if the total population is too small to audit hundreds of cases, then the auditing process 
is best understood not as a means of obtaining a statistically reliable picture of conditions 
in the population, but as a kind of pilot study informing decisions about the merits of 
existing review procedures.  And even small samples subject to audits can expand 
knowledge considerably.152  Finally, regardless of the size of the population, the 
149
 For example, if a sample of 1,000 cases is drawn randomly from an infinitely large population where one 
half of the population hold a characteristic, the researcher has a 95% chance (or better) of obtaining a result 
that is plus or minus 3.1 percentage points of the actual distribution in a population.  If a sample of 5,000 is 
drawn under the same conditions, the 95% confidence interval would be plus or minus 1.4 percentage 
points.  And if a sample of 10,000 is drawn, the 95% confidence interval would be plus or minus 1 
percentage point.  See ALAN D. MONROE, ESSENTIALS OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 69 (2000).  While 
increasing the sample size has diminishing marginal returns in large populations, things are more 
complicated with smaller sample sizes.  See CAROLE SUTTON AND MATTHEW DAVID, SOCIAL RESEARCH 
154 (2004).
150
 An exhaustive analysis of 25 cases of Guantanamo detainees, for example, constitutes about 5% of the 
total population.  But in orthodox statistical terms it yields far less reliable information than a sample of 1% 
of the total population of 100,000.  Cf. Monroe, supra note 114, at 69.
151
 Even in such situations, the concept of statistical confidence ought to be treated as a species of metaphor, 
and applied with some nuance, since the auditor’s role here is not to estimate a precise quantitative 
parameter but to conduct a reasoned analysis of the decision in accordance with a defensible standard.  For 
an interesting effort to address the problem of tailoring qualitative concepts of reliability in the analogous 
context of property value appraisals, see Nathan Berg, A Simple Bayesian Procedure for Sample-Size 
Selection in an Audit of Property-Value Appraisals, POLITICAL ECONOMY WORKING PAPER NO. 06/04, 
UNIV. OF TEXAS, DALLAS (May 2004)(on file with author).
152 Cf. Sutton and David, supra note 114, at 154 (even a sample as small as 30 can yield useful statistical 
information). Moreover, it may be possible to deal with domains involving extremely low numerosity by 
creating a reliable system to randomize the probability that a decision will be reviewed at all (or, to put it 
differently, by lumping together several classes of related, low-numerosity decisions and then auditing 
some proportion of them).  Cf. March et al., supra note 31, at 2 (noting that sometimes “[o]rganizations 
attempt such pooling” of cases to create a larger sample from which to assess performance).
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proportion of cases audited can be adjusted to achieve the related but distinct goal of 
deterring malfeasance by placing decisionmakers on notice that some proportion of their 
choices will be scrutinized.
Sample size also depends on whether audits are meant to address both over- and 
under-enforcement.   Audits could, for example, include both instances where targeted 
discretion resulted in some sanction or cost being imposed (creating the potential for so-
called Type I errors), as well as those instances where it was not imposed (Type II 
errors).  For example, should someone audit just those cases where a charity was
designated as a global terrorist organization, or also those where sanctions were not 
imposed?  It’s quite likely that we would learn a good deal from including the cases 
where powers were not used.  But this would raise two problems that demand attention.  
First is deciding whether the expanded population of cases should include the whole 
universe (i.e., every charity, or perhaps every charity operating in the Middle East) or just 
“near misses” (charities that attracted the attention of State, Treasury, the CIA, or the 
NSC but, perhaps because of political considerations, were not specially-designated).  
The former is more accurate but would so quickly consume auditing resources that it may 
prove unworkable, at least initially.  In response, auditors could design pilot studies, 
some of which could be targeted to domains where under-enforcement appears likely to 
be a more pronounced problem a.  The latter is simpler but less accurate.  The second 
problem is overcoming the likely political resistance (from the executive branch, who 
would already have reason to resist audits) that would arise if auditors further expand 
their mandate to include discretionary decisions not to act.  Part IV returns to the question 
of how auditors could mitigate more general problems of political resistance over time, 
and explains how such resistance can have the laudatory effect of giving auditors reason 
to cultivate reputations for impartiality.
The prospect of overcoming political resistance to audits depends in part on what 
precise institutional actor shoulders the burden of auditing.  To some observers, it may 
seem as though courts lack the inclination, legal authority, culture, or expertise necessary 
to engage directly in audits, though they could probably appoint masters to do some of 
this work and they could fashion doctrines conditioning deference on the existence of 
reliable auditing done by someone else, or providing for audits as a remedy in the 
(unlikely) case where litigation itself reveals bureaucratic failures.153  By rewarding 
bureaucracies with reliable audit structures, courts could advance two interrelated 
objectives.  They could contribute to mechanisms likely to enhance the overall quality of 
discretionary decisions (relative to some defensible, socially-relevant standard of quality 
encompassing, for example, reductions in the probability of obvious mistakes), and they 
would be creating the conditions for enriching the information on the basis of which a 
court can resolve specific cases.  To the extent that courts are viewed as unable to require 
audits given constraints in their ability to impose procedures not explicitly grounded in 
statutes,154 legislators could create an Article I court with a distinctive mission and 
resources to build specialized capacity – or an entirely separate bureaucracy.  Among 
existing agencies, the GAO and IG Offices are best positioned to do this sort of work 
153
 They would have to do this in a way that avoids running afoul of the Supreme Court’s Vermont Yankee 
decision.  See Vermont Yankee, 439 U.S. at 961.
154 Id.
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(though, as I note below, they have largely avoided doing so).  In short, while audits 
could be performed by existing federal audit bureaucracies, a combination of judicial and 
legislative innovation could lower barriers preventing Article III courts from more easily 
encouraging audits.
Whatever the precise organizational structure, the auditor must be invested with 
the power to compel production of evidence and testimony.  In the absence of such 
power, it would be hard for the auditor to delve into enemy combatant designations or 
container inspections more aggressively than a court could.  Sensitive information could 
be reviewed in-camera, an approach that would further weaken the argument that review 
should be precluded because the information involved is too sensitive.155  Because this 
problem has been so often managed in other contexts, I suspect any objection to audits 
relying on it is a red herring.  Recent history is full of examples where this problem has 
been solved.156  In addition to courts reviewing the information in camera, high profile 
commissions like the September 11 Commission and expert working groups routinely get 
security clearances and access to classified information.157  The resulting, publicly 
disclosed work product either omits classified information or provides some redacted 
summary version of it.
Regardless of whether the case involves sensitive information or not, what 
standard would the auditor use to evaluate it?  Ideally the statutes or constitutional 
provisions implicated in the discretionary decisions would provide some standard for the 
auditor to use, even when the standard is too vague for courts to apply.  Or the auditing 
authority can analyze whether a number of statutes and constitutional doctrines together 
could be taken to imply conditions on the use of discretionary powers.158  The auditor 
155
 Under existing law, judges sometimes handle sensitive information and use it to make decisions in cases.  
See U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).  It’s hard to see why audits of targeted discretion should be avoid 
on the grounds that the underlying discretionary decision depends on sensitive information.  If the 
argument is that it’s dangerous or problematic to share the results of audits of targeted discretion because 
the policy domain requires complete secrecy even of the quality of decisions being made – then that 
argument should be advanced on its own merits and it should have to overcome a high barrier.  See, e.g., Ex 
Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).  Even in the prosecution of alleged Al Qaeda terrorist Zacharias 
Moussaoui,  the federal government provided Moussaoui’s defense team with the opportunity to review 
classified information in the context of the criminal discovery process.  See A. John Radsan, The 
Moussaoui Case: The Mess From Minnesota, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1417, 1433 (2005).
156 See, e.g., Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174 (DC Cir. 2004).
157 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004).
158
 Deriving such implicit standards is exactly what the Supreme Court has discouraged in cases such as
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).  There the Court held that agency decisions not to use their 
enforcement powers are almost always “committed to agency discretion” under the terms of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-706 (2000).  The exception is where a statute provides 
“clear guidelines” that a court could use as a standard against which to judge agency decisions.  Indeed, 
when no such standard is apparent on the face of the statute, then courts tend to find that the absence of 
such a standard overcomes what is otherwise a presumption of reviewability.  See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 
U.S. 182 (1993).  What these cases sometimes gloss over (but seem to recognize far more explicitly in 
cases involving the nondelegation doctrine) is the extent to which the existence of standards is on a 
continuum, where virtually any government action or inaction (including decisions not to prosecute) could 
be evaluated in accordance with some defensible criterion. For an exception, see Adams v. Richardson, 480 
F.2d 1159 (DC Cir. 1973)(agency has “consciously and expressly adopted a general policy” that is so 
extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibility).  This is not to suggest that courts 
should be the primarily actors in conducting targeted discretion audits (perhaps some independent auditing 
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could even use statements from the executive branch itself to see whether the audited 
cases seem to be consistent with those statements.159  In some circumstances, where the 
executive refuses to articulate an explicit standard to fill in gaps left by executive, 
legislative, or judicial silence, the auditor itself could articulate a reasonable standard 
(which is, by the way, what the GAO and IG do in related context, when they audit 
“broad management practices”).  The standard might reflect insights drawn from 
constitutional interpretation, policy considerations, or even statutes’ legislative history. 
A final issue concerns the consequence of audit results.  As an initial thought 
experiment, imagine that the auditor labors under a default presumption that the results of 
its investigation will simply be announced to the public.  A striking feature of audits may 
ultimately prove their capacity to enhance how executive authority is policed without 
directly delivering relief.  What this would accomplish depends on the reactions of 
legislators and the mass public, which can vary depending on the circumstances.160  Not 
everyone among the public would care enough about how laws are applied on their behalf 
to respond with indignation to audit results revealing arbitrariness in the process to 
determine who is allegedly raising money for terrorists or engaging in environmental 
violations.  Nonetheless, as Part III notes, reports from existing audit bureaucracies turn 
out to already generate dozens of stories in national newspapers and television networks.  
Thus, public disclosure may have the potential to impact crucial features of the political 
game as the executive branch seeks to demonstrate its competence.
But audits’ touchstone is their flexibility.  The auditor might be empowered to 
impose belated sanctions whenever audits reveal problematic cases.  A woman 
improperly barred from entering the country could be allowed to return.  Assets that 
should not have been frozen could be unblocked.  Enemy combatants could be set free.  
This is certainly a principled position, though it obviously raises certain costs associated 
with the audits, and could ultimately affect their political feasibility.161  A third approach 
is for the results of audits to trigger additional procedural standards, such as review of 
more decisions through stratified sampling targeting areas where problems have been 
newly discovered.  Perhaps more important, auditors and courts may gradually come to 
view themselves in a symbiotic relationship, as courts adjust their calculus of deference 
to executive action in response to audit results or the existence of audit programs for 
authority including a mixture of judges and non-judges would have more flexibility to articulate standards).  
It is, rather, to point out that courts’ reluctance to articulate standards when they find them missing on the 
face of a statute should not be taken as an indication that such an enterprise is fruitless.
159
 For example, if statutes say that the CIA Director can fire someone for being a national security risk and 
let him define what that means, then the audit could review the definition with particular care to see if it’s 
plausible – and announce the results.  Or it could rely on agency definitions of “national security” in related 
contexts.  Cf. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 836 (suggesting that an agency decision not to enforce could be 
challenged if the agency itself has committed to act in specified circumstances).
160 See Asher Arian, Political and Economic Interactions with National Security Opinion: The Gulf War 
Period in Israel, 43 J. CONFLICT RES. 58 (1999); David O. Sears et al., Political System Support and Public 
Response to the Energy Crisis, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 56 (1978).
161
 Although I do not develop the argument here, one might imagine a situation where the designers of the 
audit system would trade-off the ability to grant relief in exchange for the political and economic resources 
to audit more cases or to do so more intensely.  Truth Commissions, for example, reflect an equilibrium 
where supporters have likely traded off explicit punitive power in exchange for political and economic 
resources.
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particular sectors of activity, and auditors adjust the standards they use to audit cases in 
response to judicial elaborations of statutes or constitutional doctrines.  
In any event, the choice among these alternatives is not one that can be taken in a 
vacuum.  It is likely to depend heavily on some of the political considerations I discuss in 
Part IV.  What’s important is to think of the choice not only in terms of what benefits 
could be provided to aggrieved individuals, but also (more generally) how different 
remedial schemes are likely to impact agencies’ willingness to learn from their mistakes 
and structure its work to avoid future abuses.  In short, through careful institutional 
engineering, analogies to existing, institutions, and some experimentation, most of the 
“problems” identified can be solved.  We might then ask whether such problems have 
been solved already.
III.
WHY REFORMS WOULD CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH THE STATUS QUO
The analysis began (for expositional clarity) by focusing primarily on court 
review of executive discretion.  In reality, though courts have distinctive legal powers, 
they are but one component of a larger web of institutions potentially capable of 
overseeing executive discretion.  The value of supplementing judicial review with a new 
program for auditing executive discretion depends largely on whether or not such audits 
are already commonplace.  Audits of targeted discretion may sound like exactly the sort 
of work that the GAO and the IG Offices already do.  These audit bureaucracies were, 
after all, created to audit the government, and their jurisdiction has expanded to include 
investigating the management of government programs.162  Their activities are sometimes 
directed by legislators, who (in turn) can proceed with their own audits.  Do they?
A.   Federal Bureaucracies Do Not Ordinarily Perform Audits
For the audit bureaucracies the answer is generally “no.”  These agencies 
undertake a tremendous amount of interesting and often quite valuable work on 
bureaucratic performance.  The scope of their authority is quite broad.  The GAO, for 
example, has the power to examine “any matter” relating in some way to the 
disbursement of public money.163  The Inspector General offices in federal departments 
have a similarly broad mandate.164  Yet they appear to rarely perform audits of executive 
discretion involving random (or stratified) sampling of legally consequential 
discretionary decisions, assessed against a defensible standard (either a pre-existing one 
or articulated by the auditors).  
A small literature addresses the historical origin, legal jurisdiction, organization, 
and culture of these audit bureaucracies.165  But we know relatively little about what the 
reports of these audit bureaucracies are about, what methods they use to develop their 
analyses, whether these reports contain recommendations that agencies actually 
162 See infra notes __-__.
163
 31 U.S.C. § 712 (1).
164 See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101  (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
165 See, e.g., Light, supra note 43; ROGER R. TRASK, DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 1921-1966 (1996).
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implement, and whether any of this gets media attention.  These questions are relevant to 
the present project because they affect whether there is a deficit of the kinds of audits I 
recommend, and their answers help us learn something about how audit bureaucracies 
could enhance their supervision of executive discretion.
Some preliminary answers emerge from the initial results of a more extensive, 
ongoing study of the audit bureaucracies currently underway.  The results reflect an 
analysis of 400 Inspector General and GAO reports issued during the last five years.  The 
reports analyzed assess the work of five major government agencies with a broad 
spectrum of responsibilities.166  The analysis reveals audits of executive discretion (i.e., 
analyzing (1) a random sample (2) of executive branch legal determinations and (3) 
identifying or defining a standard against which to assess such decisions) to occur in 
fewer than 2% of the reports in the sample.167 Fewer than one in five reports in the 
sample appear to use any sampling from a larger population, and the vast majority of 
these focused on the traditional financial accounting functions that convey almost no 
information about how an agency uses its legal discretion to affect directly the fortunes of 
individuals or groups.168 Not a single one focuses the inquiry on domains where an 
agency exercises significant legal discretion, defines a standard in advance, and reviews a 
subset of cases at random.  Some reports occasionally chronicle problems in 
administrative systems like those governing aviation security.  Nonetheless, audits of 
166
 The analysis employs a stratified sampling design focusing on these agencies because some of the goals 
of the larger empirical project depend on closely studying the interactions between the audit bureaucracies 
and a small number of specific agencies with differing functions.
167
 Four trained research assistants coded the GAO and IG reports.  The stratified random sample was drawn 
from among reports completed between March 1999 and March 2005, and focusing on the following five 
departments (or their components): the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Labor Department, and the Department of Defense.  Of the sample 
of 400 reports analyzed, about 68 (or 18%) used some form of random sampling.  Most of these did so in 
the context of a traditional financial audit.  Only seven reports in the total sample included audits of 
executive discretion.  These covered matters such as the proportion of background checks conducted by the 
Transportation Security Agency on prospective airport screeners that met statutory standards, or the extent 
of FEMA payouts for certain disaster relief programs.  A separate comparison sample of 50 reports 
randomly selected from among those dealing with departments not in the stratified sample yielded similar 
results.
168
 For a rare example of an Inspector General report that comes close to achieving the goal of 
systematically analyzing executive discretion, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice OIG, Detainee Report, supra note 
101.  Although this report focuses primarily on describing the treatment of immigration detainees at two 
government facilities, it did undertake a through review of the files describing the status and treatment of 
the 762 aliens held in connection with the September 11 investigation.  While the report does not leverage 
the insight that fewer cases reviewed more thoroughly can sometimes yield greater information, its searing 
analysis provides so informative in part (in all likelihood) because the investigators conceived of their task 
in terms of generating information, rather than in terms of resolving particular cases.  The vast majority of 
other reports surveyed involve either the use of interviews and non-random analysis of documents to make 
broad policy recommendations, or traditional financial audits.  Of course, in some sense the GAO and 
Inspector General reports that monitor any aspect of government performance are examining the 
application of executive discretion because they are examining how agencies perform in some (ordinarily 
quite general) aspect of a mission they are lawfully empowered to undertake.  While all of these studies 
expand the scope of information (and in some cases generate considerable media attention), there is a 
striking gap in the methodology and subject matter coverage of these reports substantially overlapping with 
the audits of executive discretion recommended here.  Specifically, what the reports almost never 
encompass are systematic audits of repetitive, discrete applications of executive power affecting individuals 
or groups using sampling.
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executive discretion are essentially missing from the picture of the audit bureaucracies’ 
work.  For instance, the GAO’s otherwise thorough report on the Transportation Security 
Agency’s computerized aviation security system shows how carefully the agency 
reviewed the architecture of the computer algorithm and the management practices 
associated with the systems.  It did not, however, pick a subset of names to inquire 
exhaustively how they ended up on the list or what evidence supported that 
determination.169
Notice that the distinction between audits of executive discretion and most of the 
existing work done by the audit bureaucracies is not just a matter of what government 
conduct is analyzed, but how the analysis is undertaken.  Procurement investigations, for 
example, are a predictable staple of GAO investigations given legislators’ interest in 
dramatizing fraud and the potential cost recoveries that can help the agency justify its 
own budget. Most such investigations focus on areas where the agency or its legislative 
masters already perceive a potential problem.  No examples existed among the reports 
analyzed where the agency picks a random sample of procurement transactions to 
examine how they have been carried out.  The audit bureaucracies may have certain 
valuable pre-existing information about where problems exist.  But as the tax analogy 
demonstrates, that information is unlikely to be pervasively correct, and in any case the 
selection of a random sample of transactions to audit further burdens participants trying 
to evade review by anticipating the agencies’ priorities.
The preliminary results from the GAO/IG project also permit a partial response to 
two concerns likely to be raised by skeptics of audits.  First, would anyone in the public 
actually care about the results of the audits? Even at this early point in the empirical 
phase of the project, it appears as though GAO and IG Office reports get a considerable 
amount of attention in the print and television media.  An analysis of the number of 
stories in the New York Times and in transcripts of television news stories between 
January 2002 and January 2005 mentioning the GAO or IG Offices reveals that the audit 
bureaucracies receive considerable media attention.  Nearly a thousand articles during 
this period appearing in the New York Times mention the GAO or the IG offices.  A 
random sample of 200 of those news stories indicates that, while only about 3% of the 
stories involving the GAO appear on page 1, about 10% of those mentioning the IG 
Offices do so.  Audit bureaucracies are also discussed on broadcast news and cable 
channels.  Even in these media, nearly a hundred news segments mention the various IG 
Offices, and about 30 mention the GAO.170  These figures exceed the number of mentions 
garnered by many federal cabinet agencies.
Second, would the agencies merely ignore the prescriptive implications of audits?  
If they did, then the promised learning bonus from audits would be unlikely to 
materialize.  Although data are not yet available regarding the recommendations of the IG 
169 See GAO Report, supra note 83.  For a study of Inspectors General revealing that only about 10% of 
their audits sought to measure program results as opposed to financial, procurement, or management 
performance, see Kathryn E. Newcomer, Opportunities and Incentives for Improving Program Quality: 
Auditing and Evaluation, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 147, 152 (1994).
170
 The search involved review the transcripts of all news stories on CNN, CNBC, CBS, NBC, ABC, and 
Fox News available on Westlaw, with airdates between January 2002 and January 2005.  Transcripts of 
local news programs would probably pick up additional stories.
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offices, I have already gathered data on all the approximately 10,000 discrete 
recommendations made by the GAO over the last 15 years.  The data cover 
recommendations to the full range of federal government agencies, from Interior to the 
State Department.  An analysis of such data proves revealing.  After the GAO makes 
recommendations to an agency in its reports, its staff generally conduct follow up 
interviews, additional investigation, document reviews, and issue queries to the agency 
leadership.  The audit agency then determines (on the basis of these qualitative methods) 
whether a given recommendation is implemented sometime during the next four years.171
Nonetheless, about 79% of recommendations are implemented, perhaps in part because 
of the potential media attention reports generate.  These results must be interpreted with a
measure of sagacity.  For example, the extent to which recommendations are adopted 
may be endogenous to what the recommendation is – with simpler ones (i.e., “write a 
report on the quality of the vehicle fleet for the Secret Service”) being implemented much 
more than complicated or difficult ones (“reduce the extent to which the Secret Service 
works on simple credit card fraud cases instead of critical infrastructure protection”).  
The adoption of recommendations is likely to be influenced by political factors, such as 
the extent of division in appropriations and authorizing subcommittees that oversee the 
agency in question.  It is likely, too, that departments with different bureaucratic 
structures, institutional cultures, and particularly those with greater prestige, have 
different reactions to the GAO recommendations.  What makes little sense is to reject the 
relevance of the audit bureaucracies, even if they do not currently perform the sorts of 
audits that would generate critical missing information about the use and abuse of 
executive discretion.
B.  Neither Do Legislators
Another possible setting where audits of executive discretion could take place is 
in the legislature, where hearings to oversee the bureaucracy are routine and legislators 
often complain loudly about what agencies have done.  As it turns out, most legislative 
oversight activity has virtually nothing to do with systematically auditing targeted 
discretion.  In Part III I suggest some of the reasons why, as with the audit bureaucracies, 
there seem to be so few audits of targeted discretion.  In what follows I just want to 
provide a brief outline of what legislative oversight activity tends to look like, and how 
this is different from targeted discretion audits.
Legislators depend on oversight of the bureaucracy to achieve their goals.  Soon 
after legislators arrive in Washington, many of them almost invariably find they can reap 
considerable rewards from oversight activity.  It lets them achieve desired policy goals.  
It also lets them claim credit for making the government work more efficiently and 
effectively.  As a consequence, legislative oversight activity takes on a bewildering array 
of forms, including – among others – formal committee and subcommittee hearings, staff 
investigations of bureaucratic practices, direct contact between a legislator and an 
agency’s leadership, meetings with the White House to enlist its support in pressing a 
bureaucracy into service, and control of the appropriations process.172  In the mid-1980s, 
171
 The agency (quite plausibly) assumes that if a recommendation is not implemented within four years of 
being made, it probably will not be. Interview with GAO Official # 1 (Washington, DC; January 2005). 
172 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY (1990).
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political scientists Mat McCubbins and Tom Schwartz introduced what has become an 
incredibly durable framework for thinking about legislative oversight of the 
bureaucracy.173  Police patrol oversight involves legislators using their time, staff, and 
other resources to engage in fairly constant vigilance of agency outputs – primarily 
through staff investigations and committee hearings.  In contrast, “fire alarm” oversight 
requires less constant attention from legislators and their staff.  Instead, legislators wait 
for “fire alarms” to be pulled by interest groups and portions of the public (occasionally, 
perhaps when galvanized by media attention to some perceived regulatory problem).  To 
encourage this sort of activity, legislators create procedures such as the federal
Administrative Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information Act that let groups more 
easily learn what’s going on.  Legislators rely on these parties to assist (implicitly) in the 
oversight process.  In short, fire alarms involve two related features: (a) reliance on 
interest groups (or, on occasion, a politically engaged citizenry), and (b) episodic 
legislative responses to instances where these groups express profound concern with 
some aspect of bureaucratic activity.
Useful as it is from a political perspective, fire alarm oversight is precisely the 
opposite of a random audit.  Unless legislators directly create a procedure to audit 
targeted discretion (they haven’t so far), then fire alarms would virtually never involve 
auditing, but rather sharp responses when problems have already surfaced.  Moreover, 
because targeted discretion often (though not always) affects individuals or groups 
without ready access to political power, fire alarm oversight would be particularly 
unlikely to uncover problems.  In contrast, police patrol methods are much more 
consistent with the kind of audits I describe.  Yet there is little evidence from 
congressional testimony and hearings that this is the sort of oversight that legislators do 
directly.  In fact, what their public statements seem to suggest is that if anyone is doing 
the kinds of audits that reveal problems with government, it’s the GAO and the IG 
Offices, not their own staff.174
No doubt that congressional investigations often uncover important trends or 
problems in bureaucratic activity, whether such investigations are triggered by fire alarms 
or they arise from more pervasive police patrol methods.  While it is true that some forms 
of legislative control can substitute for other mechanisms – like audits – two basic facts 
might nonetheless make audits of executive discretion distinctive compared to most of 
what legislatures, courts, and audit bureaucracies currently undertake.  (1) Legislators 
train their attention on what catches their attention, not on a random sample of 
discretionary decisions.  Decisions that are not reviewed randomly (or through a stratified 
random sample) tend to provide a biased sample.  The results skew the picture of 
bureaucratic activity that emerges, either because of inherent characteristics in the sample 
or because the players being “audited” strategically distort what they’re doing in the 
decisions more likely to be audited.  Cases that are not reviewed at all don’t become the 
subject of any legislative, political, or public pressure.  (2) Even when legislators and 
their staff choose to focus on a particular agency function, their oversight does not 
necessarily imply review of specific decisions.  As with the audit bureaucracies, oversight 
173 See Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. 
Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166-68 (1984).
174 See, e.g., Light, supra note 43, at 42
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hearings may focus on systemic issues such as an agency’s policy priorities or its 
handling of obvious crises.  While staff may occasionally review random samples of case 
files, this is not a routine component of legislative hearings.  From a prescriptive point of 
view, the results may provide less explicit – and instead more ambiguous – findings, 
which are harder to interpret and have less to say about whether government is 
performing effectively.
IV.
WHY AUDITS FACE POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
Judicial review is likely to do a poor job of generating information useful in the 
oversight of executive discretion, because the standard of deference is often set too high 
to yield a meaningful chance of discovering problems.  Audits could tell us more, at a 
reasonable cost.  But they rarely happen.  Why?
A.  Political Actors Have Polarizing Incentives
Two important sets of actors who have stakes in the work of the executive branch 
may find their goals cut against audits of executive discretion.  Officials in the executive 
branch (and their allies in the legislature) could institute an audit system internally.  They 
could support its implementation by the GAO and IG offices.  Or they could advocate for 
it in the legislature.  The other set of players involves those legislators (and their allies 
among organized interest groups) who are generally opposed to expansive power in the 
executive branch.175
Here is the problem.  Other things being equal, executive branch officials would 
be loath to part with discretion.  Discretion helps authorities carry out the functions that 
they are expected to, like keeping threatening people out of the country, prevailing in 
military operations abroad, or (at least some of the time) keeping industrial workplaces 
safe.  Discretion is also valuable because it helps create certain impressions among 
superiors, legislators on appropriations committees, interest groups, and the public.  
People respond to what they can see.  Executive discretion lets government officials (or 
their subordinates) choose what seems to be happening in a given area of the law.  It 
stands to reason that losing some of this power is not a welcome prospect.  Neither is it 
desirable to face the additional costs and the possibility of embarrassment that come with 
more stringent audits.  One might expect supporters of executive power in the legislature 
to take a similar position.176  And some officials may simply crave power for its own 
sake.  In short, other things being equal, executive authorities and their allies should be 
expected to seek more discretion, and less review.  Unless those authorities have reason 
175
 Obviously there are still other players who matter.  There may be moderate legislators, for example, who 
have an interest in restraining abuses but fundamentally accept the argument that intrusive judicial review 
may be too costly.  I suspect both that these actors could play a crucial and constructive role in promoting 
bureaucratic changes that could contribute to improvements in how we oversee targeted discretion.  I also 
imagine that their numbers have been thinned by the increasing polarization of politics described by some 
recent work among political scientists.  See Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, 
Political Polarization and Income Inequality, Princeton University Department of Politics: Working Paper 
(January 27, 2003)(on file with author).
176
 Unless, of course their support of executive branch power is overwhelmed by incentives to support (for 
example) legislative power.
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to limit their flexibility in order to demonstrate their competence,177 these players would 
probably prefer to avoid the embarrassment of an audit that does not show them 
succeeding, and to retain the benefits of the flexibility implied by that discretion.
What about legislators concerned about limiting executive power?  Think first of 
the legislators who tend to distrust what the executive branch is doing.  As noted earlier, 
legislators tend to lack incentives to audit rather than to rely on police patrol methods.  
Even assuming that the conditions are present to make these legislators want to use police 
patrol methods instead of just waiting for an interest group to complain, it’s not obvious 
that the critics of executive power would want to press for rigorous audits instead of 
simply polarizing the debate or attempting to embarrass their political opponents.178  A 
highly polarized debate has some benefits.  It may galvanize support among certain 
constituencies.  And opposition legislators (along with their allies in external interest 
groups), enthralled by the prospect of an optimal gamble, may prefer to win across the 
board than to support solutions that no doubt seem to some like flimsy half-measures.
One can tell much the same story about advocacy organizations outside 
government.  If the issue is the treatment of enemy combatants, for example, 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch may strongly prefer a system where 
authorities implement the Hamdi decision in a way that drastically cuts down on 
executive discretion.  Audits may seem like a poor alternative by comparison.  The 
choice between promoting audits (as a compromise) or pressing for a more stringent 
standard of deference across the board thus depends, as before, at least in part on the 
players’ subjective assessment of the probability that they will prevail in advocating for 
the across-the board standard.  No doubt some determined advocates of more stringent 
judicial review would ground their commitments on their perception that courts are more 
politically insulated from legislative or executive pressures than the audit bureaucracies.  
They may laud courts’ role in articulating the underlying nature of constitutional 
commitments, or to directly impose reforms on public bureaucracies through structural 
injunctions.179  But in practice, these principled rationales may exacerbate a perception 
among critics of executive authority that measures short of substantially more stringent 
judicial supervision would yield little or no benefit. 
In short, polarization among political advocates seeking maximal advantage in 
their efforts to expand or limit judicial review probably diminishes the extent of political 
interest in review mechanisms that may be socially optimal.  When players have more 
polarized views about executive branch power, substantive policy and law, or both, they 
probably have less to gain from investing a compromise.  Conceptually, audits embody 
just such a compromise.  Their architecture necessarily resonates most with observers 
who simultaneously worry about the drawbacks and benefits of greater review of 
177
 For a discussion of the possibility that executive authorities could limit their discretion as a means of 
sending a costly signal of their to the public, see Cuéllar, supra note 67.
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the audits will reveal.  But whatever political benefits audits can provide must be weighed against the 
opportunity costs that I discuss above. 
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 Because these observations raise valid concerns, the approach described here is designed to work in 
tandem with, rather than to entirely supplement, judicial review.  See supra notes__.
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executive discretion, and least with those for whom such a syncretic exercise seems 
unnecessary.
B.  Institutional Inertia Locks In Existing Conceptions of Adjudication
To the extent that lawyers concerned with the exercise of discretionary powers 
view themselves as zealous advocates on behalf of individual clients, they may find little 
solace in a system that randomly selects cases for review.  Even observers without 
individual clients to represent may naturally seek to focus attention on strategies to obtain 
direct relief for aggrieved individuals.  This conception is likely to exist in some tension 
with the notion that more can be learned through reviewing fewer cases more thoroughly, 
even if the role of audits is to supplement rather than replace such review.  Observers 
emphasize the value of adjudication as a recourse that should be available to, and provide 
a remedy, to similarly-situated parties.  Judgments that don’t provide a remedy may strike 
some observers as ridiculous, and why some scholars have persuasively shown how it 
makes little sense to think about adjudication constitutional rights without “equilibrating” 
that adjudicatory process with the remedies in question.180
Audits of executive discretion do not conform to these assumptions.  In a narrow 
sense, they randomly privilege some people – whose cases are selected for audits – and 
not others.  They do not provide an obvious remedy, though it is certainly possible to 
forge a system that makes remedial contributions by affecting the ordinary course of 
judicial review.181  They seem, as a result, to be ill-fitting proxies for a persistent set of 
concerns that underlie the normative case for less deferential adjudication.  It is 
undoubtedly true that constitutional provisions and values may require adjudication, and 
that many deficiencies in adjudication are best remedied through changes in adjudication.  
Nonetheless, it seems equally clear that the prevailing conception of adjudication 
could unduly dampen interest in audits.  It promotes the misleading sense that the value 
of audits are primarily seen where an individual abuse (or mistake) is discovered, and 
corrected.  Instead, the point of audits is to shed light on the entire system and how it 
works.  This has always been a concern of adjudication as well, but perhaps it sometimes 
gets lost amidst the pressing rhetoric about protecting individual rights.  Courts inclined 
to serve as a counterweight can do so by crediting, during arbitrary and capricious or 
substantial evidence review, agencies who incorporate credible audits of their decisions, 
or who have been subject to such audits from the GAO and Inspector General offices 
recently.  Although Vermont Yankee and similar cases preclude the full range of judicial 
elaboration of new procedures, it does not strain the existing scope of review to suggest 
that courts should attend to the internal and external procedures shaping the extent to
which a specific agency decision becomes arbitrary.182
Indeed, while Vermont Yankee may arguably limit courts’ abilities to directly 
impose audit requirements through expansive interpretations of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, audits seem directly germane to the familiar procedural due process 
180 See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
181 See supra Part I.c.
182 Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accouuntability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative 
State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003).
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balancing framework ordinarily traced to Mathews v. Eldridge.183  By privileging the 
importance of accuracy-enhancing mechanisms, Mathews implies that (where protected 
interests are at stake) auditors’ work could illuminate questions central to procedural due 
process analysis, such as the probability that individuals or groups will suffer erroneous 
deprivations under existing (as opposed to plaintiff-requested) procedures.184  As they 
respond to conceptual and political objections, auditors (and audit supporters) may thus 
find solid ground from which to emphasize the potential intersections between the work 
of courts and auditors. 
C.  Narrow Conceptions of Auditor Mission Prevail
Like all bureaucracies, the GAO and IG Offices are also affected by prevailing 
conceptions of their mission found among its internal staff and leadership as well as 
external constituencies.  Government employees who have some flexibility to choose 
what to do and how to do it tend to make choices reflecting – at least in part – their own 
sense of the mission they are supposed to carry out.  Those choices can reinforce external 
perceptions, which in turn affect the work referred to the agency, the financial resources 
it receives, the people who apply for jobs there, and the standards used to evaluate 
whether the agency is succeeding in its work.  Together these factors then combine with 
the more prosaic political pressures both within and outside the agency to shape its work 
environment.  
Since the GAO and IG offices were created to serve as auditors, at least one 
factor shaping the priorities of these bureaucracies is rooted in organizational conceptions  
of how the role of an auditor should be defined.  The legislators who created these 
bureaucracies and their successors may have long thought of these bureaucracies as a 
means of detecting financial mismanagement or malfeasance.  In the late 1970s, a GAO 
report commented on legislative plans to create IG offices, and emphasized the urgent 
importance of auditing the finances of government agencies.  A scholarly commentator 
notes how this report emphasized the tenor of the congressional discussion at the time:
Surveying every unit of the federal government, from whole agencies to small 
program offices, GAO found that almost a third had not had a financial audit 
since 1974.  In unusually dramatic prose on the front cover, the report announced: 
“One hundred and thirty-three units, with annual funding in excess of $20 billion, 
told GAO they had not received a financial audit during fiscal years 1974 through 
1976.185
Politics has cemented the early focus on financial auditing and procurement.186
The audit bureaucracies’ legislative overseers expect them to demonstrate results, both in 
the sense of providing useful vehicles for legislators to achieve their own strategic 
objectives and in the more prosaic (and often overlapping) sense of detecting financial 
183
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improprieties that, where rectified, produce additional government revenues.187  In some 
ways, these constraints are a reflection of legislators’ own aforementioned incentives.  
Legislators can nudge or even force these agencies to undertake work the lawmakers 
desire.  Given these realities, it is not surprising that the audit bureaucracies so 
consistently seem to embrace the fire alarm (and, to a more limited extent, the police 
patrol) approach associated with legislative oversight.It’s not easy to find legislators or 
executive branch officials in favor of waste, fraud, or (financial) abuse – though 
(particularly for the GAO) it’s certainly plausible to think that the content and 
aggressiveness of investigations targeting such problems would change depending on the 
partisan composition of the legislature and executive branch.188
On occasion, legislators may find audit bureaucracies useful to generate publicity 
and promote policy objectives not related to the advancing the ubiquitous mantra of 
eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse.189  Nonetheless, the legislative requests that drive a 
considerable proportion of the GAO’s work (and probably some of the work of Inspector 
General’s offices) appear to reflect considerable resilience in the extent to which the audit 
bureaucracies are viewed as experts in investigating financial management: who spent 
what funds, why government vehicles were used for that trip, or why these employees 
were asked to work on some questionable task.  The same may be largely true of 
managers and officials within the agencies themselves.  Many Inspectors General have a 
background in financial management or accounting, as do a considerable proportion of 
staff at the GAO.  
The audit bureaucracies are not entirely devoid of flexibility.  It would almost 
certainly prove misguided to see the political and organizational constraints on audit 
bureaucracies as insurmountable, or their mission as entirely static.  Even if they were, 
there is likely more than just legislative pressure at work in determining the audit 
bureaucracies’ agenda.  Recurring disagreements among legislators almost certainly leave 
the audit bureaucracies with a measure of discretion.  Existing law already provides both 
the GAO and IG offices with broad jurisdiction to audit executive discretion.  Over the 
last few decades, the audit bureaucracies have used that jurisdiction to generate (often at 
congressional request) the broad analyses of management practices and administrative 
priorities in public bureaucracies that, together with the aforementioned financial audits, 
constitute the bulk of their work.  
Still, change is unlikely to come easily.  Whether the audit bureaucracies assume 
the responsibility for auditing executive discretion or a separate auditing authority is 
created, greater use of that jurisdiction to effectively audit executive discretion depends 
in large measure on demand from politically significant constituencies such as legislators 
187 See, e.g., Testimony of the Hon. Pete Sessions, Seven Years of GPRA: Has the Results Act Provided 
Results? (July 20, 2000), avail. at 2000 WL 1211285 (F.D.C.H.) 
(“GAO has identified waste, fraud and abuse in government programs in amount of over $800 Billion in 
the last 5 years.”).
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189 See Light, supra note 43, at 44 (noting how “some member[s] of Congress… use IG input to frame 
issues for resolution.  However, some members of Congress have been less concerned with policy reform, 
using the IGs instead to score short-term political successes.”). 
54
and organized interest groups.    Although change in their agendas is not impossible, the 
preceding discussion shows it to be unlikely.  If political forces do not directly foster 
change then the fate of audits depends on the prospects for a degree of autonomy among 
the audit bureaucracies themselves.190  Despite appearances to the contrary, it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient merely to enhance the formal independence of the audit 
bureaucracies.  As with minority-protecting institutional rules like the Senate filibuster, 
legal changes in an agency’s formal autonomy can invariably be undone unless the 
agency has managed to enshrine the notion (among politically relevant elites or the larger 
public) that its autonomy should be protected.191 The development of public 
bureaucracies during the last century provides ample evidence of agencies responding 
reflexively to political demands, but also of agencies forging coalitions and manipulating 
their political environment to become founts of major policy innovation as the nation 
evolved.192 At the Postal Service, the Forest Service, and the Food and Drug 
Administration, agency leaders empowered by having successfully led transformations of 
staff selection and promotion paths became determined policy innovators by cultivating 
support among professional elites and the mass public.193 As the audit bureaucracies 
themselves evolve, their leaders may gradually awaken to the simple realization that they 
are capable of acquiring some measure of autonomy along these lines, overcoming 
political constraints by cultivating reputations for relative impartiality and technical 
competence.  In the process, the audit bureaucracies remain capable of playing a unique 
and exceedingly valuable part in public life by auditing executive discretion.  Their 
greatest legacy may lie in steadily forging coalitions that would make it possible for them 
to play that role.
CONCLUSION
The inexorable logic of executive discretion destines it to carry risks as well as 
rewards.  Pervasive discretion lets government protect the environment, prosecute serial 
190 Cf. DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002). The auditor’s capacity to 
undertake audits in a manner that embodies some principled standard therefore depends on two critical 
factors.  The first is whether the auditor manages to create a sufficient degree of autonomy from the 
ordinary political pressures that might keep the entity from being purely a creature of the legislature (or the 
executive).  As Carpenter notes, this tends to turn on the capacity of the agency to forge ties to 
policymaking elites that support its mission and favorable impressions among the mass public (which 
suggests that, in a sense, it is these segments of the public guarding the proverbial guardians).  The second 
is whether – given such autonomy – the agency’s leaders and staff sufficiently value their information-
generating mission to expend the necessary effort to generate material information.
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rapists, keep workers safe at industrial sites, and fight battles to protect its citizens.  But 
history writes a damning indictment of discretion’s abuse.  It describes not only how 
Nixon’s IRS embarrassed his enemies, or how Hoover’s FBI libelously fed speculation 
that slain civil rights workers were promiscuous, mentally-ill subversives, but also how 
even the most determined and virtuous government officials fail to learn from their 
mistakes when they don’t know they have committed them.  None of this should be 
surprising given what is known about organizations, the people who run them, and the 
complicated legal mandates entrusted to them. 
This article considered the implications of these facts in light of two other 
realities.  Judicial review does not constrain the exercise of many forms of executive 
discretion that would nonetheless almost certainly benefit from some external review.  
Regulatory and prosecutorial enforcement decisions are among the most cogent 
examples.  And we do next to nothing to audit how that discretion is used, despite the 
presence of compelling reasons to think that executive branch officials will have a 
relentless tendency to frequently misuse that discretion.  Because some discretionary 
actions can signal competence and resolve to naïve observers among the mass public, 
executive officials may have an incentive to use their discretion to create favorable 
impressions.  Some officials or their employees may be far less subtle and engage in 
willful misconduct that is unlikely to be detected.  Even the most noble officials and 
organizations may have a harder time learning without external mechanisms to 
systematically review and critique their work. 
When policymaking elites and organized interests discuss the costs and benefits 
of executive discretion, they tend to respond by fueling a familiar debate about the value 
of greater judicial scrutiny of executive discretion. While this article does not dismiss the 
value of such greater scrutiny, particularly in the provision of discrete remedies for 
aggrieved individuals and groups, it offers an alternative to the polarized rhetoric of that 
debate.  It effectively says: even if one accepts that more stringent judicial review is 
impossible, one should not therefore accept that the correct result is to let the executive 
branch’s wheels keep on spinning as they always have.  The key to that alternative is to 
recognize that a substantial dimension of the problems associated with policing executive 
discretion involve information.  Information is what impels the case for audits, which in 
turn hold the promise of severing the connection between the perceived costs of 
encroaching on discretion (both in terms of direct review costs and in terms of 
interference with the valuable characteristics of discretion) and the stringency of review.  
Indeed, government powers to inspect, fine, prosecute, enforce, and detain may rightly 
seem less threatening if their use can be effectively monitored through audits or similar 
procedures. 
On the other hand, it may seem at first as though audits would only work if we 
lived in a world perfect enough to make them unnecessary in the first place.  But the 
institutional design problems associated with auditing executive discretion call for an 
altogether subtler diagnosis.  Instead, four dynamics help explain that continuing embrace 
of judicial review, and the concomitant absence of activity auditing targeted discretion.  
When lawyers and policymakers erase the distinction between targeted discretion and 
broader policy judgments, they unduly restrict the scope of options available to help 
balance discretion’s benefits and costs.  Which is just fine for presidential 
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administrations, executive officials, and legislators supporting executive power:  They 
will tend to be perfectly happy to let that power evade more frequent review.  Somewhat 
counter-intuitively, advocates of restraining that power may also have incentives to 
oppose audit-like approaches as a matter of political strategy, because it lets them sound 
the alarm to their supporters while they fight for more aggressive review across the 
board.  That fight happens in a context permeated by persistent (yet ultimately 
misleading) norms about the appropriate relationship between adjudication and review of 
executive discretion, and similarly durable conceptions of what existing auditors should 
do when they supervise government agencies.  Weakening these dynamics may require 
propitious circumstances and Herculean feats of advocacy, but not the “perfect world” 
that would let us dispense with audits (or, indeed, judicial review) altogether.  In the 
course of navigating the imperfect world in which law actually operates, the possibility of 
auditing executive discretion can be treated as a problem of institutional design.  The 
discussion thus engendered can encompass questions about who should audit, how large 
samples should be, what standard should be used, or what should be the universe of cases 
to audit.  
But a rich discussion of the means and methods for auditing executive discretion 
may serve a more immediate function.  As a thought experiment, audits help elucidate the 
conceptual murkiness of many arguments for executive discretion and emphasize the 
underappreciated importance of audit bureaucracies such as the GAO and the Inspectors 
General.  Surely it is naïve to assume reflexively that each unchecked discretionary 
decision amounts to a disaster.  What borders on madness is to think those decisions will 
turn out just fine when existing law lets them so easily escape scrutiny. If executive 
discretion is to be defended coherently against audits, the case for it must necessarily 
transcend the reflexive critiques of judicial supervision or the veneration of an 
amorphous, ill-defined political process.  Instead, the case for insulating discretionary 
decisions from audits must provide a uniquely eloquent exaltation of the value of public 
ignorance.
